Service Justice System reform and victim protection

The Armed Forces Act establishes a single system of law governing UK service personnel worldwide, enforced through the Service Justice System (SJS). The Act places commanding officers (COs) at the centre of the SJS and confers a range of powers on them. 

  

First enacted in 2006, the Act must be renewed every five years and a new Bill is currently progressing through Parliament. The preceding 2021 Act was criticised for failing to implement more of the 2020 independent Lyons Review recommendations, many of which were aimed at addressing systemic failures in the SJS. These failures have contributed to poor experiences for women pursuing cases of gender-based violence. 

  

Encouragingly, a key aim of the 2026 Bill is to improve protection and support for victims of sexual assault, domestic abuse and stalking committed by service personnel. The Government asserts that the measures build on efforts to “ensure the Service Justice System champion a victim-centred approach” and contribute to its wider strategy on violence against women and girls. 

  

This article considers selected proposals and the extent to which they are likely to deliver on those aims. 

  

  

The Bill grants Service Police new powers to authorise pre-charge custody, currently reserved for COs. It also expands search and entry powers to non-residential settings such as vessels and aircraft. These changes may enable earlier, more expert-led investigation and reduce reliance on COs, particularly in deployed contexts. 

  

In 2018, the SJS policing review found that, despite some satisfactory investigations, the Service Police “[did] not investigate enough serious crime to be considered proficient.” The issue persisted and was flagged again by the 2020 Lyons Review, which found that the Service Police were not proficient at investigating serious crimes. Similar concerns were raised by the Centre for Military Justice (CMJ) in evidence to a Defence Committee Inquiry in January 2021, noting that all of the women who contacted them about sexual offences handled inside the SJS reported serious concerns about the Service Police’s investigative capacity. 

  

The Armed Forces Act 2021 apparently sought, in part, to address these failings by implementing the Murphy Review recommendation to establish a tri-service Defence Serious Crime Unit (DSCU). This recommendation intended to improve investigative effectiveness by centralising expertise from formally disparate Special Investigation Branches of each service, thereby creating a more specialised and professional investigative capability. 

  

However, subsequent evidence suggests that these reforms have yet to resolve the underlying problems. In February 2025, the CMJ reported to the Defence Committee, that it was too early to assess the DSCU’s impact on outcomes in cases involving serious sexual offences, and that concerns remained, including delays and failures to preserve evidence. In their evidence on the 2026 Bill, the CMJ drew attention to a highly critical report from the Service Police Complaints Commissioner concerning the DCSU’s handling of a client’s case, which was ultimately transferred to a civilian police force. This development raises continuing concerns about the effectiveness of service-led investigations. Against that background, the Bill does not clearly address how these persistent failings will be remedied. Whilst a statutory Service Policing Protocol is proposed to improve efficiency and effectiveness, its practical impact remains uncertain. 

  

  

The Bill enables senior officers to apply for Sexual Harm Prevention Orders (SHPOs) and Sexual Risk Orders (SROs), aligning service practice more closely with the civilian system and facilitating earlier intervention to manage risk. 

  

In the civilian context, these orders can impose both negative prohibitions and positive requirements on the recipient with a breach punishable by custodial sentences. Although evidence suggests that these orders are underused and under researched, the first empirical assessment, published in November 2025, indicates that they may be associated with significant reductions in sexual harm. 

  

Whilst specialist NGOs broadly welcome the introduction of these new measures, they stress that they must be accompanied by training, leadership commitment and cultural change. 

  

As Aurora New Dawn notes, COs “must possess at least a basic understanding of the dynamics of domestic abuse and/or sexual violence and - if they do not – they must be receptive to specialist advice and to working in collaboration with specialists accordingly.” The CMJ adds that enforcement of these orders is a systemic challenge in the civilian justice system which must not be repeated in the SJS if they are to be effective. 

  

The Bill introduces a duty on the Secretary of State to issue guidance supporting survivors in expressing an informed view on whether an offence should be tried in the civilian or military court. 

  

This is a positive development, recognising that expecting survivors to navigate such complex decisions without support is inadequate. As Aurora New Dawn has rightly highlighted, informed choice is crucial for improving trust and transparency for survivors. However, it is still a far cry from the ongoing calls to remove the most serious offences, most notably rape, from SJS jurisdiction altogether. It is also widely accepted that neither the civilian justice system nor the SJS offers a reliably safe or survivor-centred process. The wider issue that remains unaddressed is the need for substantive reform of how gender-based violence is investigated and prosecuted across both systems. In light of the Government’s wider strategy on violence against women and girls, there is certainly a missed opportunity for system-wide change. 

  

The Bill requires the introduction of a Victims’ Code, setting out the services that must be provided to victims within the SJS. This includes access to information, support services, participation in proceedings and mechanisms to challenge decisions. Though less technical than other measures, a well-drafted, and effectively implemented code could go further than the measures considered above. Communication failures, lack of updates and poor survivor treatment are common criticisms within the SJS. A robust and enforceable code could significantly improve transparency, trust and survivor experience. There should also be provision for a remedy where the code is not upheld, to ensure it is effective and not considered merely a ‘nice to have’. As the CMJ stress, the code should make clear that these services are not optional, nor should they be withdrawn if a case proceeds in the civilian justice system rather than the SJS.  

 

 

The Bill introduces welcome structural reforms, but many measures are reactive rather than preventative. New and expanded powers alone will not engender a working environment free from misogyny, nor deal with a command culture that may discourage reporting. While the MOD has initiated non‑legislative programmes aimed at improving culture and support, serious shortcomings remain in the handling of sexual violence. Without sustained attention to institutional and cultural reform, procedural changes risk failing to address the underlying drivers of gender-based violence within the Armed Forces.