Rajiv Menon KC contempt case: High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Crown Court contempt without Attorney General

The Court of Appeal has held that the Administrative Court and Divisional Court have no jurisdiction to hear an allegation of contempt in the face of the Crown Court where the matter was referred directly by the trial judge, without any application by the Attorney General or Solicitor General. The decision in Re Rajiv Menon KC (Contempt Proceedings Against) [2026] EWCA Civ 573 resolves a significant question of constitutional principle concerning the proper channels through which Crown Court contempts must be pursued.

The proceedings arose from a trial at Woolwich Crown Court in December 2025 and January 2026, in which Rajiv Menon KC represented the first defendant in a case involving alleged offences at an Elbit Systems factory. Johnson J ruled that Menon's closing speech had breached earlier judicial directions — notably a prohibition on inviting the jury to disregard rulings of law or apply the principle of jury equity — though he expressly declined to find that any breach was deliberate. Following the discharge of the jury in February 2026, the judge referred the matter of his own motion to the Administrative Court rather than to the Attorney General, as the prosecution had suggested as one available option.

Edis LJ, sitting in the Administrative Court, declined to terminate the proceedings on jurisdictional grounds at a directions hearing in March 2026, proceeding instead to issue a summons against Menon and fix a substantive hearing before a Divisional Court. Menon appealed, contending that no such jurisdiction existed.

The Court of Appeal, constituted of Bean, Dingemans and Stuart-Smith LJJ, granted permission and determined the jurisdictional question itself, observing that to remit it risked a deeply unsatisfactory sequence in which any finding of contempt by the Divisional Court could later be overturned on jurisdictional grounds only by the Supreme Court, given the restricted appeal route under section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960.

Tracing authority from R v Gray [1900] through Balogh v St Albans Crown Court [1975] and the more recent decisions in AG v Dallas [2012] and Re Yaxley-Lennon [2018], the court identified two well-established routes available where contempt in the face of the Crown Court is not dealt with summarily: the judge may proceed under the summary jurisdiction in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Rules, or may refer the matter to the Attorney General. The court was not persuaded that a third route — direct reference by a Crown Court judge to the High Court — had any foundation in law. The weight of authority, and the constitutional logic underpinning the Attorney General's role as guardian of the public interest in such matters, told firmly against it.

The court also addressed CPR 81.6, which provides that a court considering that a contempt may have been committed shall consider on its own initiative whether to proceed. Reading that provision in context, and endorsing the analysis of Coulson LJ in Solicitor General v Holmes [2019], the court held that the rule contemplates a court considering contempt of itself, not contempt of a different court.

The Judicial Office Advisory Note, which had listed transfer to a High Court judge as one option available to a referring Crown Court judge, was noted to carry no force of law. To the extent it suggested that such a transfer could found jurisdiction in the High Court — as opposed to a reference to a High Court judge sitting as a Crown Court judge — it was inconsistent with the law as properly understood.

The appeal was allowed. The directions made by Edis LJ were set aside, and a declaration granted that the Administrative Court and Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction in the absence of an application by the Attorney General. The matter returns to the trial judge, who retains the options of referring the alleged contempt to the Attorney General, reporting the matter to the Bar Standards Board, or referring it to a High Court judge sitting as a judge of the Crown Court.