R (Castro Guallichico) v Southwark: High Court dismisses challenge to a council's direct offer housing list

The High Court has dismissed a judicial review of the London Borough of Southwark's operation of its direct offer social housing list, rejecting arguments that the council breached its own procedure, failed in transparency, and disregarded the public sector equality duty.

Jonathan Richards, sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, gave judgement on 3 July 2026 in R (Castro Guallichico) v London Borough of Southwark [2026] EWHC 1665 (Admin). The claimant lives with her husband and four sons in a two-bedroom private flat. Her two youngest children have autism spectrum disorder and complex needs, and an occupational therapist had assessed the family as requiring a five-bedroom property with a secure garden, window locks and other adaptations. It was not disputed that the current home is unsuitable. The claimant held Band 1 priority with a date of 25 October 2024 and sat on the council's direct offer waiting list.

Southwark allocates housing primarily through choice based lettings, with direct offers reserved for urgent cases. The claimant's complaint was that the list appeared to follow no discernible order: having been told she was 19th on the four-bedroom list and 10th on the five-bedroom list in January 2025, she had fallen to 30th and 16th by July. Of nine direct offers of four-bedroom properties made over an eight-month period, seven went to applicants with no waiting time but "enhanced priority". Permission had been granted by Dan Kolinsky KC in February 2026.

On the first ground, the judge reaffirmed that a public body must follow its own policy absent good reason (R (Lee-Hirons) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] UKSC 46), interpreted with common sense rather than legalism (R (Ariemuguvbe) v Islington LBC; R (Flores) v Southwark LBC [2020] EWCA Civ 1697). The published scheme made no reference to date order, and the internal procedure provided that priority was set by the date a household was agreed for a direct offer, but that a senior officer could enhance priority according to urgency. The claimant accepted there was no strict date order and no clear hierarchy of categories. On that footing, no breach was made out. The judge observed that the council's witness evidence was less informative than it might have been, though it did not lack candour.

The transparency ground also failed. A lack of detail is not of itself unlawful (R (Lynch) v Lambeth LBC; R (Babakandi) v Westminster CC; R (Willott) v Eastbourne BC [2024] EWHC 113 (Admin)). While the absence of any published criteria for enhanced priority decisions was undesirable, and it would have been preferable to tell the claimant whether such a decision had been made in her case, the possibility that a scheme could be clearer does not render it unlawful. The statutory duty under section 166A(9) extends only to general information.

The equality challenge, that disabled households faced longer waits, turned in part on data monitoring. The judge distinguished R (DXK) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and applied R (RR) v Enfield LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 1390, which confirmed there is no free-standing duty to collect statistics to satisfy the equality duty. Southwark had conducted an equality impact assessment in 2013, monitored allocations, and gathered data including on protected characteristics. The alleged disadvantage rested on a single data point, insufficient to establish a systemic failure.

The claim was dismissed on all three grounds, and the judge did not go on to consider relief.