R (BUJ) v London Borough of Bromley: Court of Appeal quashes adult education centre closure over failure to consult

Closing an adult education centre used by 99 learners with learning difficulties and disabilities, without consulting them, was irrational and unlawful. And the possibility that the council would have reached the same decision anyway was not enough to withhold relief.

In R (BUJ) v London Borough of Bromley [2026] EWCA Civ 888, handed down on 10 July 2026, Lord Justice Dingemans, Senior President of Tribunals, with whom Baker and Whipple LJJ agreed, allowed the claimant's appeal, dismissed the council's cross-appeal and quashed the decision to close the Poverest Centre.

A pressing and focused interest

The claimant, a protected party in his late thirties with learning disabilities, atypical autism and epilepsy, had attended the centre four days a week for some fourteen years. His social care assessment identifies a risk of social isolation. The centre lies close to his home, which matters because he can use a lavatory only there.

Bromley resolved to dispose of the site as part of a wider property review, allocating £27.3m to develop housing on it, and to deliver adult education from the Kentwood Centre in Penge as a hub with library and community centre spokes. Nine options had been appraised. Option six, closure and sale, was the cheapest.

Dingemans LJ upheld the finding of a common law duty to consult. There is no general duty, but this was a small group of readily identifiable people for some of whom the centre was the centre of their lives outside the home. Following ex parte Baker and R (LH) v Shropshire, they had a legitimate expectation arising from the duty to act fairly that they would be consulted before closure, and it would have been irrational to close without hearing them.

The council's submission that Save Stonehenge World Heritage Site Ltd imposes a further requirement to demonstrate prejudice was rejected. That decision illustrates that unfairness is unlikely where nobody has been prejudiced. It does not create an additional hurdle. Here the users were plainly prejudiced.

The cross-appeal on delay also failed. The claim could not in reality have been brought earlier, the decision having not been communicated to any user before the three-month limit expired, and correspondence having referred to proposed closure and to a consultation that never was.

Possible, perhaps probable, but not highly likely

The pivotal issue was section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, under which relief must be refused where it appears highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different absent the unlawful conduct. The judge below had found the failure to consult made no difference and refused relief.

Dingemans LJ declined the invitation to hold that section 31(2A) can never apply to a failure to consult. Bradbury v Brecon Beacons National Park Authority shows otherwise, and everything turns on the facts. But the threshold is high, and courts must be cautious about straying, even subconsciously, into assessing the merits.

On these facts the materials did not permit the conclusion reached below. The executive might have been persuaded that limited provision could continue at the site alongside affordable housing. A long list of twenty surplus properties had been cut to fourteen and then eleven, so the choice was not necessarily binary as between the two centres. Things had already changed: the site moved from sale to affordable housing development, and the unit count from fifty to forty-four. It is possible, perhaps probable, that the executive will decide the same way again. It is not highly likely.

The public sector equality duty challenge failed. The Equality Impact Assessment, before the executive, addressed longer travel distances, accessibility of satellite sites and disruption to familiar routines, and enabled the duty to be discharged.

A consultation compliant with the Gunning principles must now precede any fresh decision.