Ocorian v McGeoch: High Court grants possession and partial stay after allowing trust possession appeal

Appeal court makes possession order itself, awards costs, and stays possession pending a permission application.
The High Court has made a possession order over a farm at the appeal stage rather than remitting the matter to the county court, while declining to stay a costs order but granting a limited stay of possession to allow the occupier to pursue a second appeal.
Sitting in the Business and Property Courts in Bristol, HHJ Paul Matthews addressed the orders consequential on his June 2026 judgement in Ocorian Private Trustees (Jersey) Ltd v McGeoch [2026] EWHC 1693 (Ch), which had allowed the trustee's appeal against decisions of HHJ Glen and left the respondent's defence to a possession claim struck out.
The respondent argued that the trustee still had to make out a positive case on possession, and that the claim should return to the county court. The judge disagreed. Under CPR 52.20 the appeal court has all the powers of the lower court, and there was nothing left for the county court to determine. Registered ownership of a legal estate carries a prima facie right to possession, that ownership had been admitted on the pleadings, and every pleaded defence had fallen away. It was therefore right for the appeal court to make the order itself and spare the parties further cost and delay.
On timing, both sides had invoked section 89 of the Housing Act 1980, which ordinarily caps any postponement of possession at fourteen days, or six weeks in cases of exceptional hardship. The judge doubted the section applied at all. The respondent had entered under a 2009 licence that expressly excluded exclusive possession and the landlord and tenant relationship, so on its determination she became a trespasser rather than a tenant holding over. On the authorities, including McPhail v Persons Unknown and his own decision in Axnoller Events v Brake, the court would ordinarily order a former licensee to give up possession forthwith, and section 89 confers no power to suspend where none previously existed. The trustee was nonetheless content to allow up to six weeks, and, with a permission application in prospect, the judge fixed that period to avoid a scramble for an interim stay.
The trustee, having succeeded on every ground, was awarded its costs of both the possession proceedings and the appeal on the standard basis. The respondent's bid for a 50% reduction failed. Her complaint about sparse particulars was misplaced, since the claim form used the prescribed trespasser form and complied with Practice Direction 55A, and her objection to redacted Jersey material foundered because those redactions were required by a Jersey privacy order, approved by the Jersey court and raised far too late.
Applying CPR 44.2(8), the judge ordered a payment on account, treating solicitor-certified schedules as more robust than uncertified figures. He awarded around 60% of the certified costs and 40% of the roughly £216,000 uncertified total, producing £106,000 payable within fourteen days.
The stay applications divided along the line between money and property. The judge found no risk of the appeal being stifled: the respondent was represented, and her evidence, which omitted any account of her finances despite a reported €2 million from an Irish property sale and potential family lending, fell well short of the cogent proof required. He refused to stay the costs order.
The possession order was treated differently, given the potential effect on the respondent's elderly mother, her equestrian business and her animals. Balancing that against the prejudice to the trust beneficiaries, the judge stayed possession for 21 days and, if a permission application is filed within that window, until the Court of Appeal disposes of it, with liberty to apply.










