İşbilen v Turk: High Court orders intermediary for ADHD-affected defendant during evidence

The High Court has ordered intermediary assistance for Selman Turk during his oral evidence in Nebahat Evyap İşbilen v Selman Turk & Ors [2026] EWHC 2722 (BP), finding it necessary to secure a fair hearing in light of his attention difficulties associated with ADHD.

Mr Justice Adam Johnson held that assistance would be required during the defendant’s evidence, including cross-examination, but declined to extend the measure to other stages of the 11-week trial.

The application was considered following a pre-trial review on 7 October 2026, with further written submissions subsequently filed by the parties. The central question was whether appointing an intermediary was necessary to achieve a fair hearing, applying the approach endorsed by the Court of Appeal in M (A Child): Intermediaries [2025] EWCA Civ 440.

The court was guided by the principle that intermediary decisions must be tailored to the individual and the particular task, supported by evidence and reasoned judicial assessment.

Mr Turk has a longstanding diagnosis of ADHD and has taken medication for many years. Earlier psychiatric and intermediary reports, prepared in 2023, identified inattention as a continuing difficulty, with the potential to affect the coherence, completeness and accuracy of his evidence. The court accepted that there was no compelling reason to conclude that his condition had materially changed since those assessments.

The psychiatric report recommended an intermediary with relevant communication skills, regular breaks, short and clearly phrased questions, slower delivery of information and an empathetic, non-confrontational approach. An earlier intermediary assessment had also recommended support throughout hearings and conferences with the legal team.

However, the court distinguished between assistance that might be beneficial and assistance that was necessary. During an earlier contempt trial, the judge had concluded that intermediary support was not required for closing submissions. The Court of Appeal subsequently upheld the principle that a trial judge could rely on direct observations of a defendant and depart from an intermediary’s recommendations where there was a proper basis for doing so.

In the present proceedings, several factors weighed against extending intermediary assistance throughout the trial. These included regular breaks, the availability of daily transcripts funded by the parties, and opportunities for Mr Turk to review the proceedings with his legal team. The court also considered the planned pace of the claimant’s evidence, which is to be given in Turkish through an interpreter.

The judge was reassured by observations made during the earlier contempt trial, when Mr Turk had demonstrated a clear understanding of questions and a good grasp of complex transactions. Those observations supported the conclusion that his difficulties concerned maintaining attention rather than an inability to understand the proceedings.

Nevertheless, the court found that the risk of impaired attention would be heightened during Mr Turk’s own evidence, particularly under cross-examination. The allegations include dishonesty, and the psychiatric evidence indicated that his difficulties could become more pronounced when he was anxious.

Mr Justice Johnson concluded that intermediary assistance was necessary to enable Mr Turk to provide the best and most reliable oral evidence possible. The fact that he had managed to give evidence effectively in the earlier proceedings did not remove the need for support in the different circumstances of the forthcoming trial.

The court therefore directed that an intermediary be appointed for the period of Mr Turk’s oral evidence and instructed the parties to consult on arranging a ground rules hearing as soon as practicable. The question of payment fell outside the scope of the judgement, although the parties had proceeded on the assumption that funding would be available through HM Courts and Tribunals Service.

The decision illustrates the task-specific approach to intermediary assistance in civil litigation, requiring courts to balance the evidence of an individual’s vulnerabilities against the practical measures available to ensure effective participation and a fair trial.