High Court quashes disbarment in Anurag Mohindru KC v Bar Standards Board

The High Court has allowed an appeal by Anurag Mohindru KC against his disbarment, finding that a Bar Standards Board disciplinary tribunal had applied too rigid a test when assessing whether exceptional circumstances justified a sanction short of removal from practice.

In Anurag Mohindru KC v The Bar Standards Board [2026] EWHC 1604 (Admin), Mr Justice Johnson substituted a suspension already served for the disbarment ordered following findings that Mr Mohindru lied during a 2013 chambers interview, claiming he had attended Oxford University and held a cricketing blue, before fabricating a corresponding entry on his CV the following day. The dishonesty itself was not disputed on appeal. Mr Mohindru subsequently withdrew his tenancy application, and no complaint was made until an anonymous letter reached the Bar Standards Board some eight and a half years later.

The tribunal had concluded that exceptional circumstances must relate to the dishonesty itself rather than to personal mitigation, and on that basis declined to give weight to the passage of time or to Mr Mohindru's otherwise unblemished and successful career since taking silk in 2020. Mr Justice Johnson held this represented a misdirection. Drawing on the line of authority running through Bolton v Law Society, Salsbury v Law Society, Solicitors Regulation Authority v Sharma, R (Solicitors Regulation Authority) v Imran and Solicitors Regulation Authority v James, he confirmed that the nature and extent of dishonesty remains the primary focus when assessing exceptional circumstances, but found that statements to that effect had been read too literally and in isolation by the tribunal, divorced from the broader recognition in the authorities that no exhaustive definition of exceptional circumstances exists.

The judgement distinguished between personal mitigation, which carries limited weight, and the antiquity of the misconduct itself, which the court held bears directly on what sanction is now required to maintain public confidence. Mr Justice Johnson noted that the lies, though repeated within a short period, were not connected to the provision of regulated legal services, involved no financial dimension or criminal offence, yielded no material gain, and caused no demonstrable harm beyond Mr Mohindru himself.

The court also addressed the tribunal's treatment of Mr Mohindru's defence at the disciplinary hearing, during which he denied the charge and suggested the CV entry may have been fabricated by another party. Mr Justice Johnson found that while a respondent's denial cannot itself be held against them, the tribunal's reference to the defence having "involved alleging far more serious dishonesty against unknown others" risked treating the conduct of the proceedings as an aggravating factor, contrary to the Bar Standards Board's own sanctions guidance, which confines such treatment to attempts to lay blame elsewhere at the time of the original misconduct rather than during subsequent litigation.

Having identified these errors of principle, the court declined to remit the matter to the tribunal, instead exercising its own powers under CPR 52.20 to determine the appropriate sanction on the existing evidential record. Weighing the isolated nature of the dishonesty, the absence of any criminal element or financial motive, the considerable delay before any complaint was made, and Mr Mohindru's sustained record of integrity over a two decade career, the court concluded that disbarment was no longer proportionate. The eight and a half months Mr Mohindru had already spent suspended pending appeal was held to represent a sufficient sanction.

A separate ground of appeal concerning costs was conceded by the Bar Standards Board, with the costs order reduced from £54,780 to £36,155 to reflect that only one of the two original charges had been proved.