High Court dismisses challenge to Northamptonshire warehouse scheme near protected bird site

Judicial review over habitat mitigation for warehousing near Upper Nene SPA fails on all grounds.
The High Court has dismissed a judicial review challenge brought by a local campaign group against North Northamptonshire Council's decision to grant planning permission for 185,000 square metres of warehousing near the Upper Nene Valley Gravel Pits Special Protection Area, rejecting arguments that the council had unlawfully treated replacement bird habitat as mitigation rather than compensation.
In R (Staunch Campaign Limited) v North Northamptonshire Council [2026] EWHC 1962 (Admin), Sir Peter Lane dismissed all five grounds advanced by Staunch, which campaigns to protect the Upper Nene Valley, against the council's approval of a hybrid planning application by I.M. Properties Limited for warehousing on greenfield land near Titchmarsh.
The development site was accepted to be functionally linked land, used by overwintering Golden Plover and Lapwing for foraging despite lying outside the protected area itself. After Natural England rejected an initially proposed mitigation site as unsuitable, the developer's ecological consultants identified 20 hectares at the nearby Lilford Hall Estate as a replacement, a location kept confidential at the landowner's request until October 2025. The council secured management of that land for at least 80 years through a section 106 agreement, and Natural England ultimately confirmed it concurred with the council's conclusion that the development would not adversely affect the protected site's integrity.
The claimant's central argument was that the council had failed to grapple with whether the replacement habitat properly constituted mitigation, addressed under article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, or compensation, which would trigger the far more stringent test under article 6(4) requiring no alternative solutions and imperative reasons of overriding public interest. Drawing on the Court of Justice's decisions in Briels v Minister van Infrastructuur en Milieu [2014] PTSR 1120 and Grace v An Bord Pleanála [2019] PTSR 266, the claimant argued that replacement habitat located away from the site of loss was inherently difficult to forecast with the necessary scientific certainty.
The judge rejected this analysis, distinguishing those authorities on the basis that both concerned development occurring within the protected site itself, where habitat loss was unavoidable regardless of later replacement measures. Here, by contrast, professional consensus throughout, including from Natural England, treated the Lilford Hall Estate land as capable of avoiding harm before it arose, squarely within the concept of mitigation as explained by Sales LJ in Smyth v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2015] PTSR 1417. The judge found no principal important controversial issue requiring specific reasons on the mitigation/compensation distinction, and in any event held adequate reasons had been given.
A separate ground concerning reports that the Lilford Hall Estate's owners had been burying and burning waste on adjacent land was also rejected, the judge accepting unchallenged expert evidence that any contamination would not undermine the mitigation area's ability to function as intended, and noting that the section 106 agreement's enforcement mechanisms provided a further safeguard. The judge likewise rejected arguments that the council had failed to properly assess in-combination effects with a neighbouring warehouse scheme at Castle Manor Farm, for which permission had been granted on appeal, finding no evidential basis for a claim, raised only in skeleton argument, that acoustic disturbance from the development would undermine the effectiveness of that scheme's own separate mitigation land.
The judge characterised the claimant's core complaint as, in substance, a disagreement with the council's planning judgment rather than a demonstration of public law illegality, and dismissed the application for judicial review in its entirety.










