F v King's College London: EAT confirms tribunals may refuse poorly particularised amendments without inviting clarification

The Employment Appeal Tribunal has held that an employment tribunal did not err by refusing an application to amend a claim that lacked sufficient particulars, and was not obliged to invite clarification before deciding it. In F v King's College London [2026] EAT 146, His Honour Judge Auerbach dismissed appeals against two 2022 decisions, one refusing the amendment and one refusing reconsideration.

The claimant, a litigant in person, presented his claim in June 2022 with a 26-page close-typed narrative that cited numerous factual allegations and statutory provisions. After receiving the response, he applied to add a whistleblowing detriment complaint under section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996, describing it as a new label attached to facts already pleaded. An employment judge refused the application because it gave no detail, such as what detriment he said he had suffered. A request for reconsideration was rejected. The claims were eventually heard in November 2025. Ordinary unfair dismissal and two harassment complaints succeeded, but no detriment complaint on protected disclosure grounds was before the tribunal.

The EAT allowed two restated grounds to proceed. The first alleged a failure to apply the correct principles or weigh relevant considerations. The second, in the alternative, alleged a failure to give the claimant a chance to clarify the amendment, relying on Amey Services v Aldridge. The claimant did not attend and relied on written submissions.

Judge Auerbach noted that a tribunal's failure to cite authority is not itself an error of law. Drawing on Basra and Remploy v Abbott, he identified two touchstones for whether an amendment is sufficiently particularised. The tribunal must have enough to consider the implications of allowing it, including for disclosure and witness evidence, and the respondent must be able to defend it fairly and the tribunal to know which issues it must decide.

On ground two, he accepted that Amey and Chaudhry v Cerberus Security describe the options as allow, refuse or clarify, but rejected the suggestion that clarification must be offered first. The authorities use the word "option", he said, and a tribunal may properly conclude that inviting clarification would serve no good purpose or would disrupt the management of the claim.

He also addressed the principle in Hart v English Heritage that case-management decisions are not revisited absent a material change of circumstances. It applies when a tribunal is asked to decide essentially the same matter afresh. A differently framed application in overlapping territory may not be caught, and an earlier refusal may instead form part of the background. However, a badly drafted application later redrafted is unlikely to amount to a material change if it seeks to add the same claims.

Applying those principles, the judge agreed that the application made clear no new facts were sought. The tribunal was nonetheless entitled to reject it as deficient. It did not identify which communications were said to be protected disclosures, or which conduct was said to be detrimental treatment on that ground. The original narrative compounded the difficulty with a scattergun approach to legal provisions and blurred victimisation and protected disclosure complaints. While tribunals must make allowances for litigants in person, a claim must still convey the essential facts behind each complaint, citing Pranczk v Hampshire County Council and Moustache v Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. The reconsideration application supplied no missing particulars, and the document attached to a later claim did not cure the defect. The lack of particulars alone justified both refusals.

The judge rejected the respondent's argument that the appeals were academic. A further application in September 2025 was refused partly for lateness, and a properly framed application in 2022 might have produced a different outcome. Both grounds nevertheless failed on their merits. A refusal, he added, would not preclude a fresh and properly particularised application.

The claimant's costs application, concerning the respondent's handling of the appeal bundle, was also dismissed. Disputes over bundle contents are common and usually resolved by dialogue, and nothing here amounted to unreasonable conduct.

Ronnie Dennis, instructed by Kingsley Knapley LLP, appeared for the respondent.