Until recently, all personal injury claims, including those for childhood sexual abuse, were subject to a three-year limitation period. The clock started on a complainant's 18th birthday and expired when they turned 21, although claimants could – and often did successfully – persuade the court that it would be equitable to allow the claim to proceed out of time.
Removal of the three-year time limitation period was recommended by the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA), which was established following the Jimmy Savile scandal and other revelations to examine more broadly how UK institutions protected, or failed to protect, children from abuse.
The final IICSA report, published in 2022, made a series of recommendations. The proposed removal of the limitation period was the subject of two consultations in 2024 before the government announced its reforms, stating that primary legislation would be required to implement the change.
The effect of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 was the addition of two new sections to the part of the Limitation Act 1980, which deals with time limits for personal injury claims.
Section 11ZA, headed “Actions in respect of personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse”, provides that time limits do not apply to actions for damages for negligence, nuisance or breach of duty when three cumulative conditions are met: the damages consist of or include damages in respect of personal injuries to the claimant; the claimant was under 18 when the cause of action accrued; and the act or omission to which the personal injuries were attributable consisted of sexual abuse.
Section 11ZB then qualifies this for cases where the defendant satisfies the court that a fair hearing is no longer possible. The provisions came into force on 29 June 2026.
The case and the central issue
In KHX v Isle of Wight Council [2026] EWHC 1949 (KB), Ms Justice Obi handed down what is believed to be the first judgment to consider the scope of the new limitation provisions.
The claim concerned allegations of abuse by two individuals, both of whom had been employees of the defendant. Against one, only physical abuse was alleged. Against the other, the allegations were of sexual abuse.
Limitation was not pursued at trial in relation to the alleged sexual abuse. It was pursued in relation to the physical abuse, the alleged perpetrator of that abuse having died prior to trial, though hearsay evidence was available.
The claimant's counsel argued that s11ZA was broader than the defendant contended. In particular, the language of “action” could be contrasted with “cause of action”, and “includes” was expansive, meaning that once the provision was triggered by an element of sexual abuse forming part of the proceedings, it applied to the entire claim. Reliance was placed on Azaz v Denton [2009] EWHC 1758 (QB), an authority on the interpretation of s11 of the Limitation Act.
The defendant maintained that while, consistently with other parts of the legislation, “includes” had been specifically adopted in relation to the first condition, it had been deliberately excluded from the third condition by the drafters – limiting the effect of the section to those parts of proceedings which concerned sexual abuse.
The judgment
Ms Justice Obi heard the trial over 14 and 15 July 2026 and handed down judgment on 30 July.
The claim was dismissed in its entirety, based on the judge's assessment that the claimant had not proved, on the balance of probabilities, that either the alleged sexual or physical abuse occurred.
On the limitation point, Ms Justice Obi concluded that Parliament had enacted a test comprising three cumulative conditions, each of which must be satisfied. Condition three was drafted in a way that was inconsistent with the proposition that distinct allegations of physical abuse were brought within s11ZA solely because they were advanced alongside allegations of sexual abuse. Azaz v Denton, which concerned s11 of the Act, did not override the clear wording of condition three.
The judge observed that the case itself demonstrated the difficulty with the claimant's proposition: the claim had two distinct allegations against two different alleged tortfeasors. Only acts of physical abuse were alleged against one of them. That the allegations were pursued in the same proceedings as allegations of sexual abuse did not satisfy the wording of condition three.
Counsel for the defendant, James Weston of 7 Bedford Row, noted: “The decision on s11ZA must be the right one. Whilst s11 in Azaz was interpreted to include the whole of a mixed claim, the language in s11ZA is materially different. The relevant conditions under section 11ZA(2) must be met; it is not sufficient for the relevant damages merely to be included, as under section 11.
“The purpose of the reform was to put childhood sexual abuse in its own category as regards delay. It was, on the face of the statute, not Parliament's intention to extend this to other parts of mixed claims.”
Implications for practitioners
The case impacts a broad range of organisations, including local authority-run social services, educational institutions, religious organisations, charities and voluntary organisations, including sports clubs, healthcare providers, and liability insurers and brokers.
The suggestion that claims pleaded alongside a sexual abuse allegation would also be affected appears to go beyond the policy decisions behind the new provisions, and to disregard a longstanding view of the courts that limitation in relation to sexual abuse raises unique considerations. The claimant's proposition also risked creating a two-tier system of justice for some historical claims, whereby only those who also suffered sexual abuse would be considered under the new regime.
Several clear practice points emerge from the judgment.
Pleadings must be precise
The decision that other claims are not caught within s11ZA merely because they form part of proceedings in which sexual abuse is also alleged means the boundaries of the change are clearly delineated.
Claimant practitioners can’t assume that physical abuse allegations are carried into the new regime on the coattails of a sexual abuse claim in the same proceedings. Each allegation must be assessed against the three statutory conditions individually. Defendant practitioners must scrutinise pleadings with this in mind from the outset.
The ability to account for evidence is key
The legislation creates a rebuttable presumption that it is fair to have a trial of the facts even if the events in question happened decades ago. It is for defendants to show that a fair trial is no longer possible – an onerous task, given that defendants are expected to carry out fairly exhaustive searches for documents concerning both the complainant and the person against whom allegations are made, as well as any safeguarding records, referrals and internal investigations.
The judge's exercise of s33 discretion in this very case – taking into account documents from earlier police investigations and a hearsay statement taken prior to the alleged perpetrator's death – underlines that evidence-gathering is equally critical for allegations falling outside the new regime.
Prior to a claim, appropriate document-retention policies that reflect the new limitation law and are rigorously applied allow organisations to account for evidence which may once have existed. Once a claim is intimated and evidence preservation duties apply, it is important to move quickly to secure documents needed in the case.
Insurance cover must be reviewed
Organisations should be encouraged review their records and liaise with brokers to ascertain the extent of their historical public liability insurance cover. They should also check notification requirements – which often require insurers to be told of incidents likely to give rise to a claim – to ensure that cover is preserved in relation to claims that may arise many years later. The process may be laborious, but sexual abuse claims often go back decades and this can make them very difficult to investigate, making the preservation of insurance cover all the more valuable.
Section 33 discretion remains live
The discretion under s33 of the Limitation Act remains available to a judge in relation to other abuse allegations, leaving a broad discretion to allow other claims to proceed in appropriate circumstances. Practitioners advising defendants must engage seriously with this, rather than defaulting to arguments about the scope of the new regime.
Conclusion
It had seemed clear throughout the debate on the Crime and Policing Bill that Parliament's intention was to introduce a special limitation test for sexual abuse allegations.
Had it intended to encompass physical abuse, or the entirety of any claim containing an allegation of sexual abuse, this would have been reflected in the drafting.
The High Court has confirmed as much. For practitioners across every sector touched by historical abuse litigation, KHX v Isle of Wight Council is a prompt to sharpen pleading strategy, invest in evidence preservation, and stress-test insurance arrangements – before the next case arrives.
.jpg&w=256&q=75)
Copyright & permissions
.jpg&w=3840&q=60)
.jpg&w=3840&q=60)