Wright v SFE Chetwode: EAT clarifies burden of proof in whistleblowing detriment claims

EAT rules no formal shifting burden of proof applies in whistleblowing detriment claims.
The Employment Appeal Tribunal has held that the two-stage shifting burden of proof under section 136 of the Equality Act 2010 cannot be transferred wholesale to whistleblowing detriment claims. The judgement in Wright v SFE Chetwode Ltd & Anor [2026] EAT 180 also rejects an invitation to update the Cox v Adecco guidance to reflect litigants in person relying on generative AI.
His Honour Judge Feeny allowed the claimant's appeal on one of four grounds.
The claimant brought whistleblowing claims after her summary dismissal, relying on alleged protected disclosures about mouldy cheese served by her employer's catering team. At a preliminary hearing at which she represented herself, the Employment Tribunal struck out her second disclosure and her automatic unfair dismissal claims, made £10 deposit orders on her detriment allegations, and ordered a £1,000 contribution to the first respondent's costs of her failed interim relief application.
Deliberate concealment
The second disclosure relied on section 43B(1)(f) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, a provision apparently untouched by authority. The judge warned that the "deliberate concealment" shorthand risks missing its nuances. The disclosure must tend to show that information about a relevant failure has been, is being or is likely to be concealed. The claimant's report that she had been expected to bin the cheese discreetly could not reasonably meet that test, and the strike out was upheld.
Alternative reasons for dismissal
The tribunal struck out both automatic unfair dismissal claims because the claimant said her disclosures and her request to be accompanied were equal reasons for dismissal, so neither could be the principal reason. That was an error of law. Taking a claimant's case at its highest means taking the factual case at its highest, not assuming that the claimant will prove the prohibited reason. The claims should have been treated as alternatives.
The judge did not, however, accept that the tribunal had breached the Cox v Adecco guidance or held the claimant's use of AI against her. Endorsing Hancox v Sutherland [2026] EAT 146, he said that the obligation to understand one's own case is the same whether a party acts in person, with or without AI, or instructs a Magic Circle firm and leading counsel.
Burden of proof
On the deposit orders, the claimant argued that once she proved a protected disclosure and a detriment, the burden shifted to the respondents. Reviewing a line of authority he described as somewhat wayward, including Kuzel, Fecitt, Dahou and Osipov, the judge concluded that neither party was entirely correct.
Sections 47B and 48 contain no equivalent to section 136(2), and a respondent's failure to prove its reason does not mean the claimant wins by default. The claimant retains the overall burden, while any adverse inference is a matter for the tribunal. The deposit orders stood. The Supreme Court may yet address the issue in Rice v Wicked Vision Ltd.
Interim relief costs
The costs appeal failed. The judge declined to require written reasons from the earlier hearing, though he was surprised the respondent's lawyers had not produced a note of the oral judgement. Citing a proliferation of interim relief applications, he said such applications are not a free hit and tribunals should not be deterred from awarding costs in appropriate cases.
The EAT substituted a deposit order for the section 103A claim, remitted the right to be accompanied claim, and added the detriment of dismissal against the employer to the deposit order by consent.
A postscript records that Butterworths Employment Law Handbook had omitted the words "is being" from section 43B(1)(f) since 1999, an error now corrected.











