Westbrook v Crown Prosecution Service: High Court refuses compliance orders despite blanket SAR refusal

High Court finds CPS breached access rights but refuses relief where extradition disclosure was complete.
The High Court has dismissed claims for compliance orders under section 167 of the Data Protection Act 2018 brought against the Crown Prosecution Service and the National Crime Agency by a man facing extradition to the United States. In Robert Westbrook v The Crown Prosecution Service & Anor [2026] EWHC 2879 (KB), handed down on 9 November 2026, Steyn J found that the CPS had infringed the claimant's right of access but declined to make an order in the exercise of the court's discretion.
The claimant, who appeared in person, made subject access requests under section 45 of the 2018 Act, part of the law enforcement processing regime in Part 3. He sought all documents the CPS had sent to any court in his extradition case, and all NCA documents made available to Westminster Magistrates' Court. His central concern was that material had been placed before the extradition court without being served on him or his lawyers. An appeal against his extradition is pending.
The CPS provided nothing, relying on section 45(4)(b) and (e) and on some material not being personal data. Steyn J held that these were at most partial answers and could not justify a blanket refusal. It was difficult to see how giving the claimant information already disclosed to him, after the extradition hearing had concluded, would prejudice the prevention or prosecution of crime so as to make withholding necessary and proportionate.
The CPS argued that an alternative route to the material existed in the extradition proceedings, and sought to distinguish Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Company Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 121 on the basis that extradition disclosure rests on the duty of candour rather than a formal disclosure regime. The judge was not persuaded, noting that Kololo v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2015] EWHC 600 (QB) concerned requests linked to judicial review, where documents are likewise provided under the duty of candour.
Discretion nonetheless weighed against relief. Applying Ittihadieh, the judge accepted that a breach of duty is the starting point and that enforcement should ordinarily follow. Three factors pointed the other way. Disclosure was more appropriately pursued within the extradition proceedings, particularly given their sensitivity and the involvement of foreign states. All material filed with the court had in fact been served on the claimant, whose belief to the contrary was described as sincere but baseless. The district judge who heard the case had confirmed he dealt with it only on material served on all parties, and no without notice application had been made. Requiring an item-by-item review would be a disproportionate use of public resources with no practical benefit. Finally, the claimant's real aim was to obtain documents to assist his extradition appeal.
The claim against the NCA failed on similar grounds. Its response was one day late, which the court described as trivial. The NCA had initially relied on section 45(4)(a) but, shortly before trial, provided the withheld documents while maintaining that the exemption had been properly applied. The court found no real doubt that all responsive personal data had now been provided. The NCA's initial failure to record its reasons for the restriction, as section 45(7) requires, was a breach, but reasons were later recorded on internal review and no order was needed.
The CPS's failure to restate the right to apply to court under section 45(5)(e) caused no prejudice, as the claimant already knew of it.
Nikila Kaushik (instructed by the Government Legal Department) appeared for the CPS. Paul Chiy (instructed by the National Crime Agency) appeared for the NCA.
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