Turnquest v Water and Sewerage Corporation: Privy Council rejects adverse possession claim in Bahamas land dispute

The Privy Council has dismissed an appeal by the Bahamas' main water supplier, ruling that a landowner's imperfect documentary title defeated its claim to a small plot by adverse possession.

In Turnquest v Water and Sewerage Corporation [2026] UKPC 33, heard on 30 June 2026, the Board upheld a Court of Appeal decision reversing the trial judge. Lord Snowden gave the judgement, with Lord Sales, Lord Hamblen, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose. Dywan Rodgers and Katharine Bailey appeared for the corporation, and Krystal Rolle KC and Darron Cash for the respondent, Mrs Turnquest.

The dispute concerned about a third of an acre on Andros, where the corporation had kept two water storage tanks since about 1983. Mrs Turnquest sued in trespass, claiming through a 1963 conveyance to her late father. The corporation claimed no documentary title. The trial judge dismissed the claim, holding that the conveyance was not a good root of title because it lacked a proper description and nothing showed how the grantor came to own the land. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision.

The Board agreed with the outcome, though not all the reasoning. Relying on Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2 AC 19, it said a trespass claimant need prove only a better title than the defendant, not the "good marketable title" required between vendor and purchaser. Section 3(4) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1909, which governs sales, does not apply directly, nor does the Quieting Titles Act 1959 standard. The Court of Appeal had, however, gone too far in suggesting that any documentary title, however defective, beats a possessory one. The title must be to an estate carrying a right to possession, over the specific land.

The Board also held that a claimant cannot be required to deduce title beyond the period in section 3(4), generally 30 years. It would be irrational for a purchaser who could not demand a longer chain from a vendor to face one against a trespasser, a conclusion supported by section 8(2) of the 1959 Act. The trial judge should not therefore have looked behind the 1963 conveyance.

Turning to sufficiency, the corporation argued that the conveyance did not identify the land. It referred to 660 acres out of 860, "more particularly described" in an 1875 will, which had left parcels of 860, 660 and 100 acres out of an 18th century Crown grant. The Board found an obvious cross-reference to the 660-acre bequest and treated the 860 acres as a drafting error by a lay draftsman.

On location, the Board read the trial judge's findings as accepting that the registered survey plan placed the land within the relevant portion. That was open to her. The other two bequests could be tied to the north and east of the grant, so elimination left the 660-acre parcel, which must include the land. Historic and measured acreages differed, but not significantly.

On adverse possession, the Board applied J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419: factual possession and an intention to possess, maintained throughout the limitation period. The evidence was sparse, comprising a short second-hand witness statement. A 1983 memorandum on which the trial judge relied did not mention the land or any tanks. There was no signage, and nothing dated the fence.

The corporation's conduct also told against it. Facing a trespass complaint, it sought time to investigate, later proposed buying or leasing the land, and eventually paid $20,000 described as being for use of private land. That was inconsistent with an intention to exclude the owner. The Board did not decide whether it also amounted to an acknowledgment of title.

The Board will advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed.