Tangent Properties v Evans Homes: unjust enrichment claim time-barred as basis failed in 2016

A claim for a reasonable fee worth a claimed £5.8 million has been dismissed as time-barred, the High Court holding that the basis on which the services were rendered failed when the developer denied any contract, not when profits later materialised.

In Tangent Properties (North) Ltd v Evans Homes (Skelton) No 2 Ltd [2026] EWHC 1814 (Ch), handed down on 17 July 2026, Mr Justice Leech gave a second judgement following his February decision, in which he had rejected Tangent's contract and estoppel claims but held that its unjust enrichment claim succeeded subject to limitation, and had invited further argument on that issue.

The claim concerned services provided by Nigel Chambers in relation to the Skelton Site near Leeds from 1996. Tangent's pleaded case was that the unjust element arose when the defendant first realised profits and refused to pay a 10% share, expected to be 2022.

Leech J identified the basis objectively, drawing on H&P Advisory v Barrick Gold, Amns Middle East v LIQS and Carr LJ's analysis in Dargamo Holdings v Avonwick. The counter-performance for which Mr Chambers bargained was the entry into a binding contract obliging payment of a profit share, not the realisation of profit itself. The point could be tested simply: had no profit been made, he would have received nothing, having chosen the existing arrangement over a conventional consultancy basis and thereby taken that risk.

On when the basis failed, the judge applied the approach in Nu Line Construction v Fowler, cited by Picken J in Dargamo: the question is when both parties would reasonably be considered to have taken the position that the arrangement was finally and definitely not going to proceed. He found that point reached by 8 April 2016, when the company secretary wrote denying any contractual relationship. Weighing heavily was Tangent's own pleading that both the March and April 2016 letters denied the existence of a contractual relationship, a statement of truth signed by Mr Chambers, and a contemporaneous email recording his understanding that the joint venture was seeking to disassociate itself from the profit share agreement. The claim, issued in February 2024, was accordingly barred by section 5 of the Limitation Act 1980.

Both sides' procedural objections failed. Tangent had not pleaded the unjust factor in its particulars, contrary to the guidance of Lord Burrows in Samsoondar v Capital Insurance, identifying it only in its reply. Leech J was prepared to waive that irregularity, but only on terms that the defendant could advance any limitation defence to the claim as properly formulated. He rejected the argument that the defendant had impermissibly departed from a pleaded case founded on the general rule that time runs from receipt of the benefit, holding that once limitation is pleaded the burden lies on the claimant to prove the claim is in time, and a defendant need not nail its colours to the mast on the accrual date. Ketteman v Hansel Properties was distinguishable, the defence having been pleaded from the outset. Nor is there any rule requiring a defendant to use or lose a limitation defence by early strike-out application.

The defendant's objection that it was unfair to reopen limitation at all also failed, the judge noting that the issue had assumed far greater importance after the first judgement and that he had directed counsel to focus closing submissions on the oral evidence.

Had limitation not been fatal, Leech J would not have permitted Tangent to reopen the finding that remuneration fell to be assessed on a conventional time basis. No application had been made to defer the issue or adduce expert evidence, and, unlike in Mate v Mate, there was no evidence of what a land promoter does.