Supreme Court rules main housing duty ends automatically on acceptance or refusal of private rented offer in Bano case

The Supreme Court has ruled that a local housing authority's main housing duty under the Housing Act 1996 ceases automatically once an applicant accepts or refuses a compliant private rented sector offer, without any need for the authority to make and notify a further decision to that effect.

In R (Bano) v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2026] UKSC 22, Lord Stephens and Lady Rose, giving the judgement of the court with which Lord Reed, Lord Sales and Lord Hamblen agreed, dismissed an appeal by Sabhya Bano against Waltham Forest's refusal to accept that it continued to owe her the main housing duty after she declined an offer of private rented accommodation in Derby in June 2020. Mrs Bano, a single parent who had been accepted as homeless and in priority need in 2017, argued that the council's offer letter merely signalled an intention to end its duty in future, and that a further, notified decision was required before the duty actually ceased, meaning no clock had ever started running on her right to seek a review.

The case turned on the construction of section 193(7AA) of the 1996 Act, which provides that a council "shall also cease to be subject to the duty" if an applicant, having been informed in writing of specified matters, accepts or refuses a private rented sector offer. Waltham Forest argued that the offer letter itself constituted the reviewable decision, with cessation of the duty following automatically once the applicant responded, whether by acceptance, refusal, or in this case failing to attend a viewing that the letter said would be treated as refusal.

The Supreme Court preferred Waltham Forest's analysis. The court held that the statutory language deliberately avoided phrases such as "decides that" or "is satisfied that" found elsewhere in comparable provisions, and contrasted the absence of any notification requirement in subsection (7AA) with the express requirement in subsection (5), covering other forms of temporary accommodation, that the authority "notify the applicant that they regard themselves as ceasing to be subject to the duty". The legislative history of the equivalent provision for social housing offers under subsection (7) reinforced this reading, since Parliament had removed an earlier requirement for the authority to notify applicants of its satisfaction following a refusal. The court also rejected the argument that automatic cessation was unworkable, noting that an applicant unable to view accommodation within a tight deadline could accept the offer and then seek a review of its suitability, and that in extreme cases an unreasonably short deadline could itself render a refusal decision reviewable as irrational.

Importantly, the court held that the offer letter itself, rather than any subsequent event, was the decision capable of review under section 202, since it recorded the council's determination that the offer complied with the statutory scheme and would end its duty whichever way the applicant responded. The 21-day period for requesting a review therefore ran from the date of that letter. The court further clarified, departing from the Court of Appeal's reasoning, that later letters merely confirming an earlier automatic discharge do not themselves generate a fresh right of review, since permitting this would undermine the finality the statutory scheme intends and effectively bypass the council's discretion to extend time.

Although the practical outcome no longer affected Mrs Bano, who was rehoused in 2025, the court proceeded to determine the appeal given the public interest in resolving a point of statutory construction likely to affect a significant number of homelessness cases. The appeal was dismissed.