Stonewater v Harris: County Court confirms landlords can force entry for safety inspections

His Honour Judge Glen has ruled that District Judges do, in principle, have power to permit a landlord to force entry to rented premises in order to carry out gas and electrical safety inspections, offering guidance on a question that had produced a run of conflicting first-instance decisions.

The issue in Stonewater Limited v Harris [2026] EWCC 42 was whether CPR 70.2A(2) allows the court to order that a landlord may force entry where a tenant has failed to comply with an access injunction. Stonewater, the social landlord, held an assured tenancy of a Portsmouth flat now vested in Mrs Harris as assignee. Throughout 2025 it sought access to complete an Electrical Installation Condition Report, issuing repeated warnings before commencing proceedings in November 2025. District Judge Pain granted a mandatory access injunction in January 2026 but declined to authorise forced entry. Three further attempts, each on at least 48 hours' notice, failed because the tenant was absent rather than actively resisting. Stonewater then applied to vary the order, and the matter was reserved to Judge Glen as Designated Civil Judge to provide local guidance.

CPR 70.2A(2), derived from the former RSC Order 45 rule 8, permits the court to direct that an act required by a mandatory order be done, so far as practicable, by another person where the order is not complied with. The provision had attracted little higher-court attention and none in this context. County Court authority had split sharply. In Sovereign Housing Association v Hall, HHJ Berkeley held the rule plainly applicable, the fact that access was gained by unconventional means being nothing to the point. District Judge Cridge took the opposite view in Southern Housing v Emmanuel, reasoning that forced entry required statutory authority and that the relevant act, allowing the landlord in, was not one capable of performance by a third party locked outside. District Judges Le Bas and James later favoured permitting such orders, the former on a "deemed consent" analysis, the latter on a purposive reading of the rule.

Judge Glen rejected both extremes. He held that Cridge's conclusion, that a court cannot authorise entry to a home absent statutory authority, could not stand, pointing to search and imaging orders derived from Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes and the specific power under CPR 25.1(d). He was equally unpersuaded by the deemed consent route. A covenant to allow access binds the tenant to give access when asked, not to permit the landlord to enter at will once notice has been served.

The real question, in his judgement, was the identity of the "act" under CPR 70.2A(2). Preferring District Judge James's analysis, he held that the core act is enabling the landlord to obtain access. Where the tenant cannot or will not enable it by consent, the rule permits the court to empower the landlord to secure access by another means. Any purposive element in that reading was justified, given that committal is complex and expensive and possession proceedings disproportionate, while safety risks from undetected defects affect neighbours as much as occupiers.

The power is hedged with safeguards. Rolled-up orders will not normally be appropriate; applications should disclose information about the household and any vulnerabilities; forced access requires 48 hours' notice and must not proceed where the tenant is present and actively opposing; and a key safe fixed externally represents good practice.

A postscript notes that tenancy agreements can be drafted to secure express consent to entry in the tenant's absence, sparing both expense and court time.