Simon v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: protest restriction challenge fails at permission stage

High Court refuses judicial review of Section 14 conditions limiting pro-Palestinian protest location in Swiss Cottage.
The High Court has refused permission for judicial review of a police decision restricting where a Jewish anti-Zionist campaign group could hold its weekly demonstrations, finding none of three grounds challenging the restriction arguable.
The case, R (on the application of Janet Simon) v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2026] EWHC 2427 (Admin), was heard by Mr Justice Sweeting on 20 August 2026, with judgement handed down on 22 September 2026. The claimant, a regular participant in demonstrations organised by the International Jewish Anti-Zionist Network UK, challenged a condition imposed under section 14 of the Public Order Act 1986 on 7 May 2025 preventing the group from protesting within the Swiss Cottage area of North London.
The protests began in October 2023 near the Israeli Ambassador's residence before relocating following separate statutory directions, eventually settling in the Swiss Cottage area. Over the following eighteen months, counter-protests developed alongside the demonstrations, generating recurring public order concerns, complaints from residents and businesses, and repeated police intervention. Section 14 conditions had already been imposed and accepted without challenge on several earlier occasions before the decision under scrutiny, made by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Adelekan, excluded the group from the area entirely.
Three grounds were advanced. The first argued that the restriction was a disproportionate interference with rights under Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, given the significance of the location to the protest's message and the fact that much of the disruption relied upon by police was said to stem from counter-protesters rather than the claimant's group. The second alleged discrimination contrary to Articles 9, 11 and 14, on the basis that the group was treated less favourably than counter-protesters and that insufficient regard was given to the position of anti-Zionist Jews within the wider Jewish community. The third alleged a failure to comply with the Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.
Applying the four stage proportionality test set out by the Supreme Court in Shvidler v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs [2025] UKSC 30, the judge accepted that the claimant's rights were engaged at a high level and that the protest's location formed part of its message. However, he found that the decision makers had expressly recognised those considerations and had assessed the cumulative impact of a prolonged pattern of protest and counter-protest activity on the local community, rather than treating individual incidents in isolation. Even accepting that counter-protesters bore significant responsibility for disruption, the judge held that police were not required to disregard the practical reality of managing recurring confrontation between opposing groups, and were entitled to have regard to positive obligations to facilitate protest without treating that as removing their ability to manage cumulative community impact.
On discrimination, the judge found an obvious distinction between the position of the original protesters and counter-protesters whose activities were necessarily contingent on the underlying demonstration's location, and no arguable basis for concluding the claimant's beliefs had gone unrecognised. On the equality duty, the absence of a standalone assessment document did not of itself establish a breach, since the substance of the required considerations overlapped with the Convention rights analysis already undertaken.
The judge characterised the challenge as amounting, in substance, to disagreement with an operational policing judgement reached by experienced officers managing a sensitive and evolving situation, rather than identification of a legal defect in the balancing exercise. Permission was refused on all three grounds.










