SB v PB: how the Court of Protection balanced contact restrictions against care home placement stability

In a judgement handed down on 14 May 2026, His Honour Judge Burrows dismissed an appeal against a decision that restricted an elderly woman's contact with her daughter to two supervised hours per week. The case, [2026] EWCOP 21 (T2), raises significant questions about the Court of Protection's ability to protect the family life of residents in private care homes, and the limits of its welfare jurisdiction where a placement itself is at risk.

PB is a woman in her late eighties with diagnoses of both Parkinson's disease and Alzheimer's. Following a breakdown in domiciliary care arrangements, she was placed in a care home. Her daughter, SB, had been her primary carer at home. The care home subsequently imposed restrictions on SB's visits, citing a series of incidents including allegations that SB had brought in food that posed a choking risk, and had repositioned PB's adjustable bed in a manner that caused injury to the equipment and distress to PB. SB denied those allegations throughout.

District Judge Jackson, at first instance, declined to hold a fact-finding hearing into the history of the relationship between SB and various care providers, treating the forward-looking welfare analysis as determinative. She concluded that PB required 24-hour nursing care that could not safely be replicated at home, and that the restriction of contact to two supervised visits per week was proportionate given the alternative: PB losing her only available placement entirely.

On appeal, SB argued that the District Judge had impermissibly allowed the care home's position to dictate the outcome, and had failed to conduct a proper proportionality analysis under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The care home, as a provider performing regulated activities, is treated as a public authority by virtue of section 73 of the Care Act 2014, and is therefore bound by Article 8.

HHJ Burrows acknowledged the force of that submission but rejected it. He emphasised that the Court of Protection can only choose between options that are legally and practically available, a principle confirmed by the Supreme Court in N v ACCG [2017] UKSC 22. Where the realistic choice is binary, as it was here, the court is entitled to give decisive weight to the preservation of a stable placement, even where that stability comes at the cost of restrictions on family life.

The judgement also addresses Regulation 9A of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, which obliges registered care home providers, save in exceptional circumstances, to facilitate visits and to adopt the least restrictive measures necessary and proportionate to manage identified risks. A failure to comply exposes providers to regulatory action by the Care Quality Commission, including, in serious cases, cancellation of registration. HHJ Burrows noted that this regulatory framework provides an important accountability mechanism, though it does not translate into an immediate remedy for residents or their families in ongoing welfare proceedings.

The court was clear that tolerance of restrictive arrangements in circumstances of constrained choice is both fact-sensitive and time-limited. Any diminution of contact beyond that authorised, or any failure by the local authority to keep arrangements under active review, would require careful scrutiny in future proceedings. The judgement expressly encourages the local authority and care provider to explore ways of facilitating more meaningful contact as circumstances develop.

The case illustrates a structural tension that is unlikely to diminish. Private care home operators retain the contractual power to terminate placements. The Court of Protection has no jurisdiction to compel them to continue. Where that power is deployed, expressly or implicitly, as a means of regulating the behaviour of residents' families, the court's options are constrained in ways that its welfare jurisdiction alone cannot resolve. Whether regulatory oversight under the CQC framework can fill that gap remains, in practice, an open question.