Rixon v Barley: High Court strikes out defective libel pleadings but rejects abuse of process argument

The High Court has struck out the central parts of a midwife's libel claim against three fellow maternity safety campaigners for failing to plead reference, serious harm and damage properly. It refused, however, to strike out the claim as a whole as an abuse of process, holding that her extensive social media commentary on the case was protected by open justice and freedom of expression.

In Victoria Rixon v Emily Barley & Ors [2026] EWHC 2821 (KB), Guy Vassall-Adams KC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, gave the claimant "one last chance" to put forward a compliant pleading.

Background

The claim concerns social media posts from spring 2024, shortly after an inquest into a newborn's death at the hospital where the claimant worked. The coroner was critical of the care provided. The claimant's case, which the court took at its highest, is that she had handed over care many hours before the death, was not required to attend the inquest and was not the subject of any adverse finding.

The first post, published by Ms Barley on behalf of the Maternity Safety Alliance, did not name the claimant. It alleged that one of the midwives involved had co-founded the With Woman Movement and had not been honest about her role. The second, published by Ms Heath-Alton and Ms Smith on behalf of the Maternity Movement, referred to "the person being held responsible" having started a maternity safety group. The claimant sought damages of up to £30,000.

Reference

The claimant's pleading on the first post relied on Ms Barley's private reply to her, which the judge held applied the wrong test. Reference is objective and turns on how readers would reasonably understand the words, not on the author's understanding.

Drawing on Dyson Technology Ltd v Channel Four Television Corporation [2023] EWCA Civ 884 and Bridgen v Hancock [2024] EWHC 623 (KB), the judge rejected the argument that this was ordinary reference. Knowledge imputed to a hypothetical acquaintance is very general: they would probably know she was a midwife, but not her hospital, her involvement in that baby's care, or her role in a weeks-old campaign group. The case was one of reference innuendo, and the connecting facts had to be pleaded. The plea on the second post, which relied on an unidentified earlier social media post, was equally deficient.

Serious harm and damage

The plea that the statements were "self-evidently extremely grave" did not satisfy paragraph 4.2(3) of Practice Direction 53B or the factual inquiry required by Lachaux v Independent Print [2019] UKSC 27. Following Amersi v Leslie [2023] EWHC 1368 (KB), serious harm must also be pleaded separately for each publication. The single-sentence damages plea was described as unusually sparse.

Her later witness statement set out the very facts missing from her pleading; she should have applied to amend.

Abuse of process

The defendants relied on late issue and service, pre-action protocol failures and the claimant's running commentary on social media. The judge accepted their account of her online conduct and the distress caused, but found no abuse. Relying on Scott v Scott [1912] AC 417, he said litigants are generally free to speak about their own cases, though restrictions on disclosed documents still apply and any exaggeration could be explored in cross-examination.

Paragraphs 8 to 11, 15 and 16 of the Particulars of Claim were struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(c). Following Kim v Park [2011] EWHC 1781 (QB), the claimant must now apply for permission to amend. If the court finds no realistic prospect of success, the claim will end for one or both publications.