Replay Destinations v Royal: Privy Council rules a seller in breach can still forfeit the deposit

Privy Council holds a party's own breach does not bar termination for counterparty's repudiatory breach.
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has allowed an appeal by a Bahamian property developer, ruling that it may keep a deposit of US$774,590.53 even though it was itself in breach of contract when it terminated the agreement. The decision in Replay Destinations (Bahamas) Ltd v Royal Ltd and another [2026] UKPC 42 overturns concurrent rulings of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal of The Bahamas.
Lord Burrows gave the judgement of the Board, with Lord Briggs and Lady Rose agreeing. It was handed down on 19 November 2026.
The dispute arose from a March 2017 contract for the sale of an apartment unit on Paradise Island. Replay, the seller, was to build the unit to "White Box Completion" using final design plans supplied by the purchaser, Royal, by 30 April 2017. Royal later assigned its rights to Ocean Club Luxury Estates Ltd, although the assignment had no bearing on the appeal.
After prolonged exchanges between the parties, Replay served a notice of default under clause 14 in September 2018, requiring properly coordinated final design plans within ten days. It terminated the agreement on 4 October 2018 and retained the deposit. Royal responded in December 2018 with its own notice under clause 15, alleging that Replay had failed to verify onsite measurements, and issued proceedings in January 2020.
At trial, Stewart J found that both parties were in breach: Replay by failing to verify measurements, and Royal by failing to provide final design plans. Royal was denied damages but awarded the return of its deposit. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision.
In an earlier judgement given in December 2025, the Board held that the finding of breach against Replay was a concurrent finding of fact which could not be reopened. The appeal was therefore confined to a single point of law: whether Replay could retain the deposit under clauses 14 and 15 despite its own breach. Royal, having filed no respondent's notice in the Court of Appeal, was equally unable to dispute that it had been in breach.
The construction of clauses 14 and 15
The Board found the plain reading of the contract to be decisive. Clause 14 contained no requirement that the seller be free of breach before serving default or termination notices. Clause 15, by contrast, expressly made the purchaser's right to terminate conditional on its own compliance. Royal could not meet that condition and, in any event, its notice came after the contract had already ended. Nor did it ever serve a notice of termination.
"Subject to applicable law"
For Royal, Gail Lockhart Charles KC argued that the phrase "subject to applicable law" in clause 14 imported a general rule that a party not ready, willing and able to perform cannot validly terminate for the other side's default. Reliance was placed on Quadrangle Development and Construction Co Ltd v Jenner [1974] 1 WLR 68 and Dhand v Oakglade Investments Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 286.
The Board rejected the submission on two grounds. First, no such general principle exists. A party may terminate for the other's repudiatory breach notwithstanding its own, unless its performance was a condition precedent to the counterparty's obligation. The Board cited Chitty on Contracts and Asquith LJ's well-known observation in Howard v Pickford Tool Co Ltd [1951] 1 KB 417 that an unaccepted repudiation confers no legal rights.
Quadrangle and Oakglade were distinguished. Both concerned sale of land contracts governed by standard conditions that expressly required the party serving a notice to complete to be ready and willing to complete, and those notices made time of the essence for all outstanding obligations. Here, the default notice related only to the next step in a design and build arrangement.
Second, the words "subject to applicable law" qualified the consequences of termination, namely forfeiture of the deposit and the exclusion of damages, rather than the right to terminate itself. The Board suggested the phrase might engage equitable relief against forfeiture or liabilities that cannot lawfully be excluded, but declined to decide the point because no argument on it had been advanced.
The Board will advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed.











