Re G (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption): Court of Appeal says parent need show a "runner", not a "winner"

The Court of Appeal has allowed a mother's appeal against the refusal of leave to oppose an adoption order, holding that the judge below had effectively decided the adoption application itself rather than whether it should be contested.

Giving the lead judgement in G (A Child: Leave to Oppose Adoption) [2026] EWCA Civ 1445, Lord Justice Peter Jackson, with whom Lord Justice Newey and Lady Justice May agreed, described it as "a clear case for the grant of leave". If leave were refused to this parent, he said, it was difficult to see how section 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 offered the meaningful remedy Parliament intended.

Background

D, now aged four, entered foster care in 2024 amid concerns about her mother's substance misuse, mental health and exposure to abusive relationships. In March 2025 HHJ Levey, sitting in the Family Court at Brighton, made care and placement orders, while recognising a strong bond between mother and child. An adoption application followed in January 2026.

The mother then sought leave to oppose. Her evidence, corroborated by professionals, showed sustained abstinence, completed psychotherapy, stable accommodation, the end of her abusive relationship and a new, stable partnership. She was also caring for a younger child without proceedings. The local authority accepted that the changes were significant but argued they were not yet embedded.

The judge found the section 47(7) change of circumstances gateway satisfied. At the second stage, however, he refused leave in a reserved judgement. He concluded that the changes were recent and untested, that there were gaps in the evidence about the partner and any transition plan, and that the mother's prospects of resisting adoption were not "sufficiently strong".

The appeal

Peter Jackson LJ declined to issue fresh guidance, finding the existing authorities ample, and drew three distinctions at the welfare stage.

First, section 47(5) calls for a broad and practical balancing exercise. An overly detailed assessment risks a trial of the adoption application on incomplete evidence, as warned against in Re W [2020] EWCA Civ 16.

Second, the question is whether it is in the child's interests for there to be an opposed adoption hearing, not whether the child should be adopted. The decision concerns the management of the application.

Third, a parent must show a solid case deserving consideration, not that success is more likely than not. Borrowing from Re H [2015] EWCA Civ 1284, the court asks whether the case is a "runner", not a "winner".

The judge's conclusion amounted to a finding that the mother would not succeed. That inadvertently set a stringent test close to being unachievable, contrary to Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146. Having recognised the strength of her case, the judge should have asked why leave ought nonetheless to be refused.

Undue weight had also been given to the short-term disruption of a contested hearing. The prospective adopter would face uncertainty not of her making, but there was no evidence that D or the placement would be affected.

Meanwhile, the benefit to the child herself had been overlooked. If D is adopted, it will matter to her later to know that adoption remained necessary. If it is not necessary, refusing leave prevents the court from saying so.

Nor should the evidential gaps, which required professional assessment, have counted against the mother.

Leave to oppose was granted and the case remitted for an early case management hearing before a judge nominated by the Family Presiding Judge. The court expressed no view on the eventual outcome.

Thomas Rowland appeared for the mother and Natasha Isaac for the local authority.