R v Mohammed: Court of Appeal upholds coercive control conviction but criticises judge's invitation to flag evidential gaps

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) has dismissed an appeal against a conviction for controlling or coercive behaviour, while criticising a trial judge who told jurors they could write notes about "gaps in the evidence" and questioned witnesses at length.

In R v Mohammed [2026] EWCA Crim 1330, Lord Justice Holgate, Mrs Justice McGowan and HHJ Leigh upheld Nahim Mohammed's conviction under section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, returned at Aylesbury Crown Court before Recorder Nicola Williams in July 2025. He received a two-year prison sentence suspended for two years, with 240 hours of unpaid work and a rehabilitation activity requirement.

The prosecution alleged that between December 2019 and December 2021 he policed his then partner's clothing, make-up, contacts and movements, including by turning up uninvited at her workplace and gym, and restricted her access to family and her ability to take their daughter out. Colleagues supported her account. The appellant denied the allegations, said events had been taken out of context and called evidence including from a gym member who saw no aggression.

On appeal he argued that the judge's interventions reversed the burden of proof, encouraged the jury to adopt an inquisitorial approach, and made her appear to favour the prosecution. He also said a constant flow of the 24 jury notes interrupted his evidence and his counsel's cross-examination. The judge had questioned the complainant for about 20 minutes after prosecution counsel declined to re-examine.

The court restated the principles in R v Inns [2018] EWCA Crim 1081: the judge acts as neutral umpire in an adversarial system, may ask questions to assist the jury, and should not cross-examine a defendant or interrupt his account. It also cited Randall v The Queen [2002] UKPC 19 for the point that not every departure from good practice makes a trial unfair, and that the nature of an intervention matters as much as its number.

Applying those principles, the court found that the judge asked an unusually large number of questions of the complainant, but most checked her note or clarified evidence already given. It would have been better practice to do so earlier, but the questioning did not restate or endorse the prosecution case. Counsel did not object and declined invitations to ask further questions. A remark to the appellant that he needed to remember an event was read in context as an attempt to clarify timing. A handful of later questions to him probed unnecessarily, which the court called unfortunate, but they were isolated and did not invite the jury to reject his case.

On jury notes, the court said the first two should not have been addressed without showing counsel, but no prejudice followed. The appellant's own evidence was not interrupted by notes. Later notes were held until the next morning and dealt with in re-examination, which counsel acknowledged matched what she had planned to cover. One note referring to an unsupported allegation made in evidence prompted what the judge called very firm directions to disregard it. The court said it did not show that the jury had accepted the allegation or placed any burden on the appellant, adding that jurors' questions should not be expected to read like a lawyer's.

The court nevertheless identified a significant error. The judge had told jurors at the outset that they could send a note if they thought there were "gaps in evidence" to be addressed. Even if well intended, that was wrong, it said, being inconsistent with the adversarial system and unconnected with the rule against jurors doing their own research. Defence counsel had reasonably worried that the jury was taking on an investigatory role.

That did not make the trial unfair. Read as a whole, the notes did not show any inability to follow the directions on the burden and standard of proof. The judge gave clear directions, repeated in summing up, that the jury had no investigatory role and that the defendant never had to prove his innocence. She was right to refuse to discharge the jury, and defence counsel's ability to present the case was unimpaired. The summing up, including good character and delay directions, was not criticised, and the appeal was dismissed.