R v Asare: Leading junior remuneration appeal dismissed at costs office

On 8 August 2025, Costs Judge Leonard delivered judgement in R v Asare at the Senior Courts Costs Office, addressing a significant dispute over legal fee structures within the criminal legal aid framework. The case concerned remuneration entitlements of Mr Will Paynter, junior barrister representing defendant Moses Asare during proceedings at Snaresbrook Crown Court.

The underlying criminal matter involved Asare facing five counts of cheating HM Revenue and Customs, alongside charges relating to furnishing false information and transferring criminal property. A representation order established in June 2023, subsequently amended in June 2024, provided for dual junior advocate representation—a structure accommodating the case's complexity.

The dispute crystallised when Paynter sought leading junior remuneration rates for the period 18-27 November 2024, during which the primary advocate was unavailable due to prior commitments. The Legal Aid Agency's Determining Officer rejected this application, limiting payment to led junior or junior acting alone rates, prompting the appeal.

Central to the determination was interpreting the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, particularly provisions defining advocate classifications and corresponding fee structures. Paynter's representatives argued that his temporary assumption of primary responsibilities warranted leading junior compensation, given the substantial duties undertaken during the specified period.

Judge Leonard's analysis focused on whether Paynter's role genuinely constituted leading junior status under regulatory definitions. The judgement emphasised that whilst Paynter conducted significant work, this alone did not transform his formal position. Crucially, the regulations require a leading junior to formally lead another junior advocate—a condition never satisfied during the disputed period.

The ruling reinforced the mechanical application of remuneration regulations, distinguishing between work performed and formal role classification. Judge Leonard clarified that payment structures operate independently of work volume or perceived importance, instead adhering strictly to regulatory frameworks governing advocate hierarchy.

This principle reflects broader tensions within legal aid remuneration, where practical courtroom realities may diverge from rigid regulatory classifications. The judgement demonstrates how administrative frameworks can sometimes appear disconnected from the substantive legal work undertaken, particularly in complex cases requiring flexible advocate arrangements.

The decision carries wider implications for legal aid practice, establishing precedent regarding temporary role assumptions and their remuneration consequences. It clarifies that advocates cannot claim enhanced payment rates based solely on increased responsibilities unless formal role changes occur within regulatory parameters.

The judgement also highlights structural challenges within the legal aid system, where advocates may undertake substantial additional duties without corresponding financial recognition. This creates potential tensions between service delivery requirements and remuneration frameworks, particularly in complex or lengthy proceedings.

From a procedural perspective, the case underscores the importance of precise representation order terms and clear advocate role definitions. It suggests that parties seeking enhanced remuneration must ensure formal role changes align with regulatory requirements rather than relying on practical work distribution.

The dismissal of Paynter's appeal reinforces existing legal aid payment structures whilst providing clarity on advocate classification principles. The judgement serves as an important reference point for future remuneration disputes, establishing that regulatory compliance requires formal role changes rather than mere practical responsibility shifts.

This decision ultimately strengthens the predictability of legal aid remuneration by confirming that payment structures operate according to formal classifications rather than subjective assessments of work undertaken, providing clearer guidance for both advocates and determining officers in future cases.