R (Secretary of State for Justice) v Parole Board: High Court dismisses challenge to refusal to set aside Zenshen release decision

The High Court has dismissed the Secretary of State for Justice's judicial review challenge to the Parole Board's refusal to set aside its direction to release a life prisoner convicted of a sadistic murder in 1990, finding the set aside decision to be neither process nor outcome irrational. The judgement in R (Secretary of State for Justice) v The Parole Board for England and Wales [2026] EWHC 1382 (Admin), handed down by Mrs Justice Eady on 9 June 2026, addresses the proper application of the set aside test under rule 28A of the Parole Board Rules 2019 and the limits of judicial review of specialist risk assessment decisions.

Mr Reginald Zenshen was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1991 for the premeditated murder of a consultant surgeon, in which 17 blows were struck to the victim's head. A whole life recommendation was later revised to a minimum term of 30 years following re-sentencing by the Court of Appeal. After completing that minimum term, extensive therapeutic work, and a period in open conditions, the Parole Board directed Mr Zenshen's release on licence on 30 October 2025, following evidence from three professional witnesses who each recommended release without reservation.

In December 2025, while on release on temporary licence, Mr Zenshen was caught attempting to steal goods worth approximately £30 from his employer. He reported the incident himself and expressed remorse. His community offender manager considered the incident did not indicate an increase in risk of harm, though noted his motivation remained unexplained. The Secretary of State applied to set aside the release direction. The Parole Board refused that application in January 2026, the release direction became final, and Mr Zenshen was released on 11 March 2026. Judicial review proceedings were issued on 19 March 2026.

The court first addressed timeliness, accepting that the approximately seven-week period between the set aside decision and the issue of proceedings was, in context, sufficiently prompt given the unusual and significant nature of the decision to seek judicial review of a Parole Board decision, and the personal consideration required of the Secretary of State.

On whether the section 32ZAA referral power introduced by the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024 provided a suitable alternative remedy, the court found it did not. The court accepted that the referral power was likely available on the facts, the release direction having only become final after the provision came into force. However, a section 32ZAA referral involves the High Court applying the statutory release test afresh, not reviewing the set aside decision. The two procedures raise different questions and offer different forms of relief, and the judicial review was not one the court should decline to entertain.

On the merits, the court applied the approach established in R (Umar Jones) v The Parole Board [2025] EWHC 3216 (Admin), which confirmed that the rule 28A(4) test requires the decision maker to be satisfied that the release direction would not have been given had the new information been available, a conclusion requiring sufficient consideration of the reliability, relevance, and cogency of that information. The Secretary of State advanced grounds of both process and outcome irrationality.

Mrs Justice Eady granted permission on the process ground but dismissed it on the merits. The set aside decision demonstrated a clear focus on the risk assessment underlying the release direction and proper consideration of the new information in that context. The decision maker's conclusion that Mr Zenshen's motivation for the theft was a matter appropriately addressed under supervision in the community was not a delegation of risk assessment, but a rational evaluation of the enquiry required. Failures to expressly reference specific earlier convictions or licence condition compliance did not reveal logical errors or gaps in the reasoning, given the experience of the decision maker and the materials he had expressly considered.

Permission on the outcome ground was refused. The court declined to accept that the only rational course on the new information would have been to adjourn for a further psychological assessment. That amounted to impermissible substitution of the Secretary of State's view for that of the expert decision-making body.

R (Secretary of State for Justice) v The Parole Board for England and Wales and Mr Reginald Zenshen [2026] EWHC 1382 (Admin). Jason Pobjoy KC, Claire Palmer and Will Perry (Government Legal Department) for the claimant; Natasha Jackson (Government Legal Department) for the defendant; Nick Armstrong KC and Aidan Wills (Bhatt Murphy Ltd) for the interested party.