Privy Council clarifies prosecution time limits under occupational safety legislation

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has resolved a significant statutory interpretation dispute concerning prosecution time limits under Trinidad and Tobago's Occupational Safety and Health Act, delivering judgement in University of the West Indies v Occupational Safety and Health Authority and Agency [2025] UKPC 42.

The dispute

The case centred on whether prosecutions for safety and health offences must be brought within six months under section 93 of the Act, or within two years under section 97B. The University of the West Indies failed to report a workplace accident within the statutory four-day period, leading to prosecution over 18 months later.

The Industrial Court had consistently applied the two-year limitation period since 2014, treating safety and health prosecutions as distinct from ordinary criminal proceedings. However, the Court of Appeal reversed this approach, holding that the six-month limit applied to all criminal prosecutions.

The Authority's arguments

The Occupational Safety and Health Authority argued that the Act's definitional provisions distinguished between "criminal proceedings" in summary courts and proceedings under section 97A in the Industrial Court. This distinction, they contended, meant that prosecutions of safety and health offences were not truly "criminal proceedings" within the Act's framework.

The Authority emphasised practical differences between Industrial Court and Magistrates' Court procedures: the Industrial Court uses civil standards of proof, cannot impose imprisonment, and regulates its own procedure. They argued this supported treating Industrial Court prosecutions as materially distinct from summary prosecutions.

Additionally, the Authority relied on settled practice, estimating that 244 safety and health complaints were brought between 2021-2022 based on the two-year limitation period.

The Privy Council's analysis

Lady Simler, delivering the Board's judgement, rejected these arguments comprehensively. The Board found no principled basis for restricting the word "complaint" in section 93 to summary offences only. Section 80 empowers inspectors to "prosecute or conduct before the Court any complaint or other proceedings," using "complaint" in its ordinary sense without distinguishing between offence types.

Crucially, several provisions apply to both summary and safety and health offences without distinction, including sections 82A, 83(2) and 83(3). This indicated the Act was not drawing the distinction suggested by the Authority.

The Board emphasised that whilst the Industrial Court operates differently from summary courts, it nonetheless exercises criminal jurisdiction when determining guilt and imposing penalties for offences.

The statutory scheme

The judgement clarified that section 97B's reference to "cause of action" naturally refers to civil proceedings under section 83A, which allows aggrieved persons to seek redress. The two-year limitation period applies to these civil proceedings, whilst the six-month period in section 93 governs all criminal prosecutions.

This creates a rational scheme: criminal prosecutions must commence within six months of an inspector's knowledge of the offence, whilst civil proceedings for redress must be brought within two years of the cause of action arising.

Practical implications

The decision significantly impacts the Authority's enforcement strategy and affects potentially hundreds of prosecutions initiated on the basis of the two-year limitation period. However, the Board noted that inspectors may qualify as "aggrieved persons" under section 83A, potentially providing an alternative route for certain proceedings.

The Privy Council dismissed the appeal, establishing definitively that all criminal prosecutions under occupational safety legislation are subject to the six-month limitation period, regardless of whether they proceed in summary or Industrial Courts.