Parkingeye v Velindre: how the Procurement Act 2023 reshapes the test for lifting automatic suspensions

In a judgement handed down on 1 May 2026, His Honour Judge Keyser KC sitting in the Business and Property Courts in Wales refused applications by Velindre University NHS Trust and Cardiff and Vale University Health Board to lift the automatic suspension preventing them from concluding a car park management contract with National Parking Control Group Limited (NPCG). The decision in Parkingeye Limited v Velindre University NHS Trust & Anor [2026] EWHC 1019 (TCC) is significant as one of the first judicial treatments of the new statutory test under section 102(2) of the Procurement Act 2023, and it signals a meaningful departure from the American Cyanamid framework that governed procurement challenges under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015.

The background

Parkingeye, the incumbent provider of car parking management services across approximately 59 NHS car parks in Wales, was notified in December 2025 that NPCG had been awarded a new five-year contract following a competitive procurement run by Velindre on behalf of Cardiff and Vale. Parkingeye scored 68% overall against NPCG's 84%. It commenced proceedings during the standstill period, triggering the automatic suspension under section 101(1) of the 2023 Act. The applicants then sought to have that suspension lifted pursuant to section 102(2).

The substantive claim was extensive. Parkingeye alleged, among other things, that the tender notice identified the wrong contracting authority, that the contract value was dramatically understated (declared as £100,000 when the true figure was likely to exceed £10m), that the contract should have been classified as a concession contract under section 8 of the Act, that mandatory conditions of participation were not applied, that the technical evaluation was conducted without any independent individual assessment stage, and that record-keeping was deficient throughout.

The new statutory test

The central question before the court was the proper construction and application of section 102(2), which requires the court to have regard to: the public interest, including in upholding lawful contract awards and avoiding delay to public services; the interests of suppliers, including whether damages are an adequate remedy for the claimant; and any other matters the court considers appropriate. This replaced the American Cyanamid test applied under regulation 96(2) of the 2015 Regulations.

Judge Keyser KC held that the new test is "substantively and not merely formally very different" from its predecessor. Critically, adequacy of damages for the claimant is no longer determinative. Under the old test, a finding that damages were adequate would typically result in the suspension being lifted — a significant hurdle for claimants given the commercial nature of most procurement disputes. That is no longer the position. The adequacy of damages is now one consideration among several, and the public interest element appears first in the statutory ordering.

On the public interest in upholding lawful awards, the court rejected the applicants' argument that this limb was satisfied by the availability of post-contractual damages. Such reasoning, the court found, would render the principle "neutral at the stage of interim remedies" and would hardly have been worth legislating. Instead, section 102(2)(a)(i) reflects a public interest in ensuring that disputed contract awards are not concluded until the dispute is resolved.

As for the public interest in avoiding delay to services, the court was unpersuaded that the improvements sought under the new contract — a manned helpdesk, revised appeals procedures, enhanced permit controls and revenue sharing — carried sufficient weight. Parking services were already being provided under the extended existing contract, and Parkingeye had offered to match NPCG's revenue-share arrangement in the interim. The court found the applicants' case on anticipated benefits to be "exaggerated".

On the adequacy of damages, the court accepted in principle that Parkingeye might prefer performance over compensation, but declined to treat that preference as determinative. The court also rejected the argument that damages could not be calculated with sufficient certainty, noting the respondent's years of experience under a substantially similar contract, and dismissed the reputational damage argument for want of cogent evidence.

The suspension accordingly remained in place, with an undertaking in damages required from Parkingeye in standard form. The court noted that a judgment on the substantive claim by the end of 2026 was achievable.

Significance

The judgement offers the clearest guidance yet on how section 102(2) is to operate in practice. The threshold for lifting a suspension is now materially higher than under the old regime. Contracting authorities seeking to lift suspensions will need to demonstrate genuine and substantial harm to public service delivery — not merely the benefits of a preferred new contract — and must grapple with an express public interest in keeping contracts suspended while their lawfulness remains in dispute. A case management conference is listed for 1 June 2026.