Parker v Information Commissioner: When multiple information requests become manifestly unreasonable

The First-tier Tribunal has upheld the Information Commissioner's decision that Tendring District Council was entitled to refuse seven information requests made within one month, finding them manifestly unreasonable under regulation 12(4)(b) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004.

John Parker made seven requests between 2 June and 1 July 2024, all concerning planning matters and disputes related to Henderson Park, where he had purchased a property. The requests sought extensive documentation about section 106 agreements, planning consultations, committee training records, police meetings, delegated decision reports, and constitutional changes regarding planning approvals.

The Council refused all requests on 3 July 2024, citing regulation 12(4)(b) EIR. It argued the requests were excessive, harassing, and imposed a significant burden on its limited resources. The Council characterised the requests as attempts to serve Parker's private interests rather than the wider public good, noting they demonstrated unreasonable persistence and misuse of EIR legislation.

Parker complained to the Commissioner, who substantively dismissed the complaint in a decision notice dated 19 December 2024. The Commissioner found the Council entitled to rely on the manifestly unreasonable exception, though noted the Council had breached regulation 5(2) by failing to respond to multiple requests within 20 working days.

Parker's appeal raised several grounds, including inadequate reasoning, lack of authority to consider certain requests due to timing breaches, and allegations that the Commissioner wrongly dismissed concerns about the Council's conduct. He also sought various additional outcomes, including declarations about planning applications and orders regarding land registration.

The Tribunal applied the three-stage test from Vesco v Information Commissioner: whether requests are manifestly unreasonable; whether public interest in maintaining the exception outweighs disclosure; and whether the presumption favouring disclosure applies.

Judge Scherbel-Ball and the panel found the public interest in the requested information limited and confined. The underlying planning and property issues had already been ventilated in detail through correspondence with senior planning officials and complaints to the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman. The Tribunal noted Parker himself acknowledged having sufficient information to establish breaches, suggesting the requests represented a fishing expedition rather than focused information-gathering serving demonstrable public benefit.

The Tribunal emphasised the disproportionate burden on the Council. Seven requests within one month formed part of nine requests between 23 May and 9 July 2024, all relating to the same dispute. Many were multifaceted, effectively comprising substantially more than seven requests. For a small public authority with finite resources, this intensity and repetition placed a very significant burden, diverting resources from other legal obligations.

Whilst acknowledging Parker's genuine belief in the importance of his concerns, the Tribunal found no sufficient persuasive evidence of serious wrongdoing to justify the requests. The pattern demonstrated "vexatiousness by drift"—where an original legitimate concern morphs into something pursued in a manner that extinguishes underlying public interest and amounts to disproportionate use of information law regimes.

The Tribunal rejected Parker's argument that delayed consideration of another request (EIR 356) undermined findings about his motive. His argumentative engagement with the Council over that request, including allegations of delaying tactics, actually undermined his case. The Tribunal emphasised that mistake or oversight does not equate to bad faith, and undue readiness to make such allegations was unhelpful.

The Tribunal also dismissed Parker's additional claims, confirming it lacked jurisdiction under sections 57 and 58 FOIA to make declarations or orders concerning land, property, or planning matters he sought.