O'Boyle v Wallis: costs liability of CPR 19.12 representatives clarified

In Catherine O'Boyle v Mary Vivien Wallis [2026] EWHC 951 (Ch), Andrew Twigger KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, allowed an appeal against a costs order that had imposed full personal liability on a claimant's estate representative appointed under CPR 19.12. The judgement establishes that such a representative is not automatically personally liable for all costs ordered against the estate, and that the court retains a discretion informed by the particular circumstances of the appointment.

Background

Paul O'Boyle had brought county court proceedings against Mary Wallis arising from alleged unlawful eviction and conversion of equipment in 2014. The claim had a troubled history: five years of procedural dysfunction, multiple failed attempts to amend the particulars of claim, and persistent failings attributed to the claimants' solicitors. Following Mr O'Boyle's death in December 2024, his daughter Catherine was appointed under CPR 19.12(1)(b) to represent his estate. She had not obtained letters of administration and the order appointing her was made on 14 March 2025.

By July 2025, both Catherine and Mrs O'Boyle (the second claimant) had parted company with their solicitors and appeared in person before Master Kaye, who struck out the claims. The Master ordered "the Claimants" to pay costs on the indemnity basis and directed a £100,000 interim payment, treating Catherine as personally liable for the entirety of the defendant's costs — including those incurred years before her appointment.

The error of principle

Master Kaye had reasoned that a representative appointed under CPR 19.12, by accepting that role, takes on personal liability for all costs payable by the estate as a matter of law — in the same manner as a Personal Representative (executor or administrator). On appeal, Twigger KC held this was wrong.

Drawing on Barker v Confiànce Ltd [2021] 1 WLR 231, in which Newey LJ analysed the costs liability of litigation friends, the judgement holds that a CPR 19.12 representative is functionally analogous to a litigation friend. Both conduct proceedings on behalf of another and neither asserts their own cause of action. The relevant question in each case is not whether costs must follow, but whether, in all the circumstances, it is just to make the order.

Crucially, unlike a Personal Representative, a CPR 19.12 representative holds no estate assets, has no automatic right of indemnification, and may have little knowledge of what has occurred before their appointment. Treating them identically to an executor or administrator is not justified in principle.

The exercise of discretion

Applying the discretion afresh, the court distinguished between two periods. For costs incurred before 14 March 2025, Catherine bore no causal responsibility. The Master had expressly found the delay was attributable to the claimants' legal team, and had noted that Catherine had no real understanding of what had occurred. Imposing personal liability for that period would be disproportionate and would deter suitable individuals from accepting representative appointments.

For the period from 14 March to 18 July 2025, personal liability was appropriate — a claimant's representative has the power to decide whether to continue proceedings, and that has cost consequences for the opposing party. However, costs were to be assessed on the standard basis only. Catherine's conduct during those four months, though imperfect, was not unreasonable to the degree required to justify indemnity costs. The Master had in fact taken a broadly sympathetic view of her position; it was the erroneous equation of representative and Personal Representative that had distorted the outcome.

The £100,000 interim payment was set aside as against Catherine personally, the court being unable to apportion costs for the relevant period without further evidence, particularly given a confidential settlement with the former solicitors in the wasted costs proceedings.

Significance

The judgement fills a gap in the authorities on CPR 19.12. It confirms that costs liability for such representatives is discretionary, not automatic, and should be approached by reference to the framework in Barker rather than the rules applicable to Personal Representatives. The date of appointment is a material — potentially decisive — factor, and courts should be cautious about imposing personal liability for a period in which the representative played no part.