MUF v Secretary of State for Defence: High Court quashes fourth ARAP refusal for Afghan judge

The High Court has quashed a fourth decision refusing relocation to a former Afghan judge under the Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy, finding the Ministry of Defence had failed to grapple with a key strand of his evidence despite an extensive fresh investigation carried out after an earlier defeat in the same litigation.

In MUF, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Defence [2026] EWHC 2108 (Admin), Mrs Justice Eady considered a rolled-up judicial review challenge to a decision of February 2026 refusing the claimant's application under ARAP category 4, which covers those who worked in Afghanistan alongside a UK government department, in partnership with or closely supporting and assisting it. The claimant, previously referred to under the cipher ACG, presided at the Anti-Terrorism Court in Kabul between 2011 and 2016, trying numerous cases involving Taliban members, including a suicide bomber responsible for an attack on a supermarket used by foreign nationals.

This was already the fourth review of his application, following an earlier judgement of Sir Peter Lane which had quashed a previous refusal after finding the department's reliance on an unexplained category of "partnership judges" was, on the evidence then available, an unintelligible basis for decision-making. Following that ruling, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office undertook a considerably more thorough investigation, tracing former officials who had since left government service, and revised its account of when meaningful relationships developed between UK officials and judges at the court, now dating the change to the arrival of a Criminal Justice Adviser in May 2019, some three years after the claimant had left his post.

The claimant advanced five grounds of challenge. Mrs Justice Eady rejected his argument that the department had misapplied the eligibility test itself, finding it had properly considered both institutional links between the court and UK departments and the substance of his individual work, consistent with the approach required by the Court of Appeal in LND1. She also rejected the claim that the distinction drawn between pre and post 2019 "partnership judges" remained irrational, accepting, albeit with some unease at the department's shifting evidential position across successive cases, that the more detailed post ACG investigation provided a coherent explanation grounded in evidence from the relevant adviser.

The claim succeeded, however, on a narrower ground concerning the department's treatment of the claimant's evidence that he had, on around fifteen occasions, given oral case reports to UK officials via court administrators. The judge found this account sat awkwardly with departmental records showing no evidence of written reports being received, but concluded the decision under challenge had never squarely addressed whether such oral reporting, if accepted, might itself amount to working alongside or supporting the department's efforts to establish an effective prosecution system. Applying the heightened scrutiny appropriate where fundamental rights were engaged, given evidence that the claimant and his family faced a real risk of serious harm if not relocated, she held this omission rendered the decision legally flawed.

The remaining grounds, alleging procedural unfairness and that the department had improperly sidestepped Sir Peter Lane's earlier judgement, were both dismissed. The fourth review decision was declared unlawful and quashed, with the application remitted for a fresh decision to be made within six weeks of any appeal process being exhausted.