Muca v El Amrani and Harker v Hubert: pre-occupation gas safety certificates and the section 21 bar

Court of Appeal holds that failure to provide a gas safety certificate before a tenant first occupies is a permanent and irremediable bar to service of a section 21 notice.
The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) has handed down a significant ruling on the interaction between landlords' obligations under the Gas Safety (Installation and Use) Regulations 1998 and the restrictions on serving section 21 notices under the Housing Act 1988. The judgement in Muca v El Amrani and Harker v Hubert [2026] EWCA Civ 515, delivered on 30 April 2026, resolves a conflict that had divided county court judges and clarifies a point left open by the earlier authorities of Trecarrell House Ltd v Rouncefield [2020] and Hathaway v Minister [2021].
The central question was whether section 21A of the 1988 Act prevents a landlord from serving a valid section 21 notice where the tenant was never provided with a gas safety certificate in respect of a check carried out before first going into occupation — even where later certificates have since been supplied, the original tenancy pre-dated the 2015 legislative reforms, and the tenant is now in occupation under a different tenancy agreement.
The facts across the two conjoined appeals shared a common thread. In both cases, tenants had originally been granted assured shorthold tenancies before the Deregulation Act 2015 and the Assured Shorthold Tenancy Notices and Prescribed Requirements (England) Regulations 2015 came into force. No pre-occupation gas safety certificate had been provided at the outset. New tenancies were subsequently granted after 1 October 2015, bringing the tenancies within the scope of section 21A and the 2015 Regulations.
The landlords advanced three alternative interpretations of the legislative framework in support of their possession claims. The first argued that the 2015 Regulations required only that the most recent gas safety certificate had been provided. The second contended that the obligation under regulation 36(6)(b) of the Gas Safety Regulations applies only to occupation commencing under the specific tenancy that creates the "new tenant" relationship. The third, derived from the careful county court judgement in Cassell v Sidhu, proposed that compliance with the two most recent checks was sufficient, mirroring the two-year retention obligation in regulation 36(3)(c).
Lord Justice Newey, with whom Lord Justice Singh and Lady Justice Falk agreed, rejected all three interpretations. On the first, the court held that regulation 2(1) of the 2015 Regulations prescribes compliance with the entirety of regulation 36(6) of the Gas Safety Regulations — not merely the most recent record. The singular references to "a gas safety certificate" in the 2015 Regulations were subject to the Interpretation Act 1978 and could not, in context, indicate a contrary intention. On the second, the court held that where a person remains in continuous occupation under successive tenancies, they are an "existing tenant" to whom regulation 36(6)(a) applies from the outset of their occupation; the duty under regulation 36(6)(b) to supply a pre-occupation certificate arises only once, when a person first factually occupies as a tenant. On the third, the court found no textual or structural basis in the 2015 Regulations for limiting their operation by reference to the retention obligations in regulation 36(3)(c).
The practical consequence is stark. Where a pre-occupation gas safety certificate was never provided to a tenant, the landlord's inability to serve a valid section 21 notice cannot be cured by late provision of certificates or by subsequent compliance. Lady Justice Falk observed that this appears to render the pre-occupation certificate requirement the only restriction on section 21 use that is wholly irremediable, contrasting with all other prescribed requirements under the 2015 Regulations. The court acknowledged this may amount to "unintended collateral damage" for landlords caught by events predating the 2015 reforms, but held it was bound by the clear language of the legislation.
The Trustees' appeal in Harker v Hubert was dismissed. The appeal by Ms El Amrani in Muca v El Amrani was allowed.









.jpg&w=3840&q=60)
