MIA v PVG: Commercial Court upholds LMAA sole arbitrator appointment made by implication

Notice under LMAA Terms need not expressly warn of sole arbitrator appointment, court rules.
The Commercial Court has dismissed challenges under sections 67 and 68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 to a USD 20.2m award in a ship sale dispute. It held that a notice of arbitration under the LMAA Terms need not expressly state that the claimant's appointee will become sole arbitrator if the respondent fails to appoint.
In MIA v PVG [2026] EWHC 2959 (Comm), Mr Justice Stanley heard the matter in private because it arose from a confidential arbitration, and handed down an anonymised judgement.
The dispute concerned a July 2024 contract for the sale of a tanker. The contract was governed by English law and provided for London arbitration before three arbitrators under the "LMAA Rules", which the parties accepted meant the LMAA Terms. In January 2025 the buyers served a request for arbitration that identified the contract, quoted the arbitration clause, nominated their arbitrator, invoked paragraph 10 of the LMAA Terms and enclosed a copy of those terms. It did not, however, use the language of paragraph 10 requiring the sellers to appoint within 14 days and stating that the buyers' appointee would otherwise act as sole arbitrator.
The sellers replied that they were "ready" for arbitration but appointed no one. The buyers' nominee then accepted appointment as sole arbitrator, proceeded on the documents despite the sellers' pending application to the court, and in May 2025 found the sellers in repudiatory breach. A separate application for leave to appeal under section 69 had already been dismissed.
The sellers argued that the request was invalid, or at least could not support a sole arbitrator appointment, because it lacked the express requirement and statement set out in paragraph 10.
Stanley J rejected both arguments. Drawing on Dodika Ltd v United Luck Holdings Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 638, he distinguished between what an instrument requires a notice to contain and whether a particular notice meets that requirement. The LMAA Terms, as a standard form used across an international shipping community that is not made up only of lawyers, should be interpreted in a practical way and not in a way that sets technical traps.
The judge relied on a long line of authority, including Nea Agrex SA v Baltic Shipping Co Ltd (The Aghios Lazaros) [1976] QB 933 and Rix J's decision in The Smaro [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 225, which preferred that approach to the stricter view in Vosnoc Ltd v Transglobal Projects Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 101. On that authority, a requirement to appoint an arbitrator may be implied. The same reasoning applied to the statement about the consequences of not appointing. What can be done expressly can be done by implication, and parties to an LMAA arbitration should not have to "incant a formula".
The sellers' strongest point was that the statement served as a warning, much as the notice does under section 17 of the Act. The judge did not find it persuasive. Under section 4, parties may depart from section 17 simply by adopting institutional rules. Read as a whole, against an agreed LMAA background and with the terms enclosed, the request plainly implied both the requirement to appoint and the consequence of failing to do so. The alternative argument fell away, because the statement is a requirement of the request and not a separate precondition to appointing a sole arbitrator.
The section 68 challenge for apparent bias was dismissed briefly. Applying Halliburton Co v Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd [2020] UKSC 48 and Aiteo Eastern E&P Co Ltd v Shell Western Supply and Trading Ltd [2024] EWHC 1993 (Comm), the court found nothing in the arbitrator's lack of English qualification, his decision to proceed while the court application was pending, or his shared nationality with one party. The LMAA Terms expressly contemplate a party-appointed arbitrator becoming sole arbitrator, and nationality would not trouble the fair-minded observer in a commercial shipping case.
The court also refused the buyers' request for an adjournment, citing the size of the sum at stake, the narrow legal issue and the lack of any real obstacle to obtaining representation.











