Making accountability count

September’s promise to extend judicial review reforms to all major infrastructure projects has brought the relationship between economic growth and legal accountability into sharper focus. The government wants to accelerate development and prevent weak challenges from causing delay. Those are legitimate objectives. Yet the profession has good reason to ask how reform will preserve effective scrutiny of public decisions, and what evidence will establish that the changes achieve their purpose.

That question runs through this issue. Across corporate reporting, regulatory investigations and artificial intelligence, authority is being reassessed as institutions seek greater efficiency. Lawyers must examine what those changes mean for the people whose interests the existing safeguards protect. Accountability depends on access to information, the ability to challenge decisions and a clear understanding of where responsibility lies.

David Mendel’s examination of directors’ pay reporting on page 24 illustrates the difficulty. The proposal to remove quoted companies’ annual advisory vote on remuneration would reduce an established opportunity for shareholders to scrutinise how an approved policy has operated. Simplifying lengthy reports could make relevant information easier to understand. Removing a mechanism for expressing dissatisfaction raises a further question about investors’ practical influence. Mendel also identifies a possible consequence: shareholders may respond by demanding tighter restrictions when the remuneration policy next comes up for binding approval.

The value of a safeguard therefore needs to be assessed through its operation. A process can impose a burden while still giving those affected a meaningful voice. Reform should make that voice more effective and establish how concerns will be heard under any replacement arrangements.

Our feature on Carter-Ruck v SRA, on page 44, considers the boundaries of regulatory authority. On 21 September, the High Court held that section 44B of the Solicitors Act 1974 does not permit the SRA to compel production of material protected by a client’s legal professional privilege where that privilege has not been waived. The SRA is seeking permission to appeal. Its concern about access to evidence deserves consideration, while the judgment reinforces the need for clear statutory authority before a fundamental right can be overridden.

For practitioners, the distinction matters. Privilege belongs to the client, and assessing whether particular material attracts protection remains essential. The ruling also leaves solicitors’ obligations to cooperate with legitimate investigations in place.

Hoi-Yee Roper and Ben Amoah’s analysis of fraud investigations, on page 32, approaches professional boundaries from another direction. Bourlakova