Laffy v WKCIC Group: why a false allegation without investigation is not always discrimination

A false allegation of racism, left uninvestigated after the accuser withdrew it, sounds like exactly the kind of situation that discrimination law exists to address. The Employment Appeal Tribunal's decision in Laffy v WKCIC Group T/A Capital City College Group [2026] EAT 90 makes clear why that instinct, however understandable, does not automatically translate into a successful discrimination claim.

Mr Laffy had worked for Capital City College Group for 13 years before a sustained deterioration in his relationship with a colleague, Ms Odu, led to his constructive dismissal. The tribunal upheld that claim. What it refused to uphold were his allegations of direct discrimination on grounds of race, sex and age. Its central reasoning was that the College's handling of the dispute, whatever its flaws, was not influenced by any protected characteristic. The EAT agreed.

The facts are striking. By mid-2022, Ms Odu had made a finger gesture mimicking a gun at the Claimant, whispered "sadist" in his ear on more than one occasion, spat on the floor in front of a colleague, and then, when called in to discuss her behaviour, falsely alleged that the Claimant had called her a deeply offensive racial slur. The tribunal found that allegation to have been fabricated in order to shift attention away from her own conduct. The College neither investigated the allegation nor took disciplinary action against Ms Odu. Instead, both parties received a "standards letter" and were effectively asked to draw a line under the matter.

Mr Laffy's case was that this response illustrated a stark disparity: the College moved promptly when a black female colleague complained about him, whilst consistently failing to act meaningfully on his own numerous complaints. On the surface, the argument has intuitive force. But the EAT, in a judgement delivered by Sarah Crowther KC sitting as Deputy Judge of the High Court, found that the factual premises of that argument simply did not survive scrutiny.

This is where the case becomes instructive. Ground 3 of the appeal asserted as uncontested facts that the College had "acted immediately" on Ms Odu's allegation, had issued a "warning letter" to the Claimant despite her declining to pursue matters formally, and had taken "no action whatsoever" in response to his complaints. Crowther DJ found each of those characterisations to be inconsistent with the tribunal's unchallenged findings of fact. The College had not acted immediately; the letter was a standards letter sent to both parties, not a warning to the Claimant alone; and the College had in fact investigated several of his complaints, obtained CCTV footage, suggested mediation, and appointed an external investigator for his grievances.

The significance of this lies not in the sympathy or otherwise one might feel for Mr Laffy, but in the mechanics of the burden of proof. Under section 136 of the Equality Act 2010, a claimant must first establish a prima facie case from which a tribunal could properly infer discrimination before the burden shifts to the employer to provide a non-discriminatory explanation. The Court of Appeal's guidance in Madarassy v Nomura International [2007] is explicit that a difference in treatment and a difference in protected characteristic are not, without more, sufficient. There must be something more.

Here, the "something more" relied upon by the Claimant was built on factual assertions that the tribunal had already rejected. Without them, the prima facie case simply could not stand.

The tribunal went further and also found, even on the assumption that the burden had shifted, that the College had discharged it. The reason Ms Odu's allegation was not investigated was because she had declined to pursue it formally. The College, as Crowther DJ observed, effectively breathed a sigh of relief, used the moment to reinforce professional standards expectations and hoped the parties could move on. That may well have been optimistic to the point of weakness, but it was entirely unrelated to any protected characteristic.

What the judgement underlines is a tension that employment law frequently throws up: conduct which is genuinely unfair, and genuinely harmful, is not automatically discriminatory. Mr Laffy wanted vindication. The process denied him that. But unfairness and discrimination are not synonyms, and the tribunal was entitled to treat them differently.