Kluz-Burton v Regional Court in Warsaw: Divisional Court upholds extradition despite ministers' election-eve statements

Political comment aimed at prosecutors, not the court, leaves Polish warrant valid.
The Divisional Court has dismissed an appeal against extradition to Poland brought on the basis that ministerial statements made during a national election campaign compromised the independence of the judge who issued the arrest warrant.
In Kluz-Burton v Regional Court in Warsaw [2026] EWHC 1804 (Admin), handed down on 17 July 2026, Lord Justice Holgate and Mr Justice Johnson upheld the decision of District Judge Leake ordering the extradition of Stuart Kluz-Burton, a dual British and Polish national and YouTube creator, to face trial on four charges. Two allege sexual activity with girls under 15 and two allege inducing minors to drink alcohol. The allegations remain untested.
The appeal advanced three linked grounds: that the warrant was not issued by a judicial authority under section 2 of the Extradition Act 2003; that extradition would breach article 6 of the Convention; and that the proceedings were an abuse of process.
The allegations surfaced on social media in September 2023, days before Poland's 15 October parliamentary elections, as part of a wider controversy known as Pandora Gate. The Prime Minister, the Justice Minister, who also held the office of Prosecutor General, and a Deputy Justice Minister each posted or spoke publicly about the case in the days that followed. The Deputy Minister filmed himself outside a prison cell, and posted shortly before the detention hearing predicting its outcome. The appellant was arrested in the UK on 14 October, and Judge Dariusz Lubowski, a duty judge appointed in 2009, issued the warrant on election day itself.
Applying the two-step test in L and P, the district judge found the first step satisfied, following Wozniak v Poland, accepting systemic deficiencies in Polish judicial independence. He held the second step was not made out. He described the ministerial statements as a real matter of concern and a striking feature distinguishing the case from Wozniak, but concluded they were directed at prosecutors and the public rather than the court.
The Divisional Court rejected all eight asserted errors. The executive's disciplinary powers over judges formed part of the reasoning at step one and could not, without more, dispose of step two, otherwise that step would be redundant. Criticism of Judge Lubowski rested on a single earlier decision concerning a Dutch refusal to extradite, a decision not before the court and described by the appellant's own expert as controversial rather than indicative of partiality. The same expert accepted she could identify nothing improper in his handling of the warrant.
The timing was held to be explicable. A duty judge was available, and the authorities faced the 48-hour window under section 6, though the court observed that weekends do not count, so the period would in fact have expired on the Tuesday. The finding of an implicit flight risk was open to the district judge, notwithstanding notification of a Luton address, given the appellant's absence from the hearing and the absence of any address in Poland.
On the statements themselves, the court held that none was directed explicitly or implicitly at any judge, none carried any threat of disciplinary action, and several acknowledged that guilt remained to be proved. The correct test, of liability to influence rather than actual interference, had been identified and applied.
The article 6 case was further weakened by the change of government in Poland: the politicians in question are no longer in office, and no evidence pointed to conduct by the current administration capable of influencing a trial judge. Fresh evidence from the appellant's Polish lawyers concerned prosecutorial conduct that their own expert accepted was lawful, and evidence about the proportion of judges appointed under the reformed National Council of the Judiciary went to step one rather than step two.
Politicians seeking advantage from a case does not, without more, establish an abuse of process.












