High Court rejects local authority's deprivation of liberty application for 17-year-old

The High Court of Justice, Family Division, delivered a significant judgement on 2 May 2025 in a case concerning G, a 17-year-old whose situation underscores the complex interplay between child protection duties and adolescent autonomy rights.

G, born in March 2008, experienced severe emotional distress and expressed suicidal ideation in late 2023. After leaving his mother's care to live with his father, continued difficulties led him to seek assistance from local authorities. Kent County Council subsequently accommodated him under Section 20 of the Children Act 1989, which permits local authority accommodation when children cannot remain with their parents.

Following G's hospital admission after a crisis in April 2025, Kent County Council applied to the High Court's inherent jurisdiction for a deprivation of liberty order. The local authority sought to compel G's placement in accommodation they deemed suitable, despite his explicit opposition. The application was premised on concerns that G might abscond and cause himself harm if permitted to exercise choice over his living arrangements.

The case presented fundamental tensions between safeguarding obligations and the rights of a competent young person to determine his accommodation. G articulated clear preferences regarding his living situation and demonstrated understanding of the consequences of his choices. He argued that forced placement in the local authority's preferred accommodation would significantly damage his mental wellbeing. The Children's Guardian supported G's position, emphasising the importance of respecting his autonomy whilst ensuring decisions served his best interests.

Critical legal principles under the Children Act emerged during proceedings, particularly concerning parental responsibility and informed consent requirements. The court noted that whilst G's mother supported his accommodation, his father opposed it, creating conflicts over valid consent under the legislative framework. G's capacity to consent was recognised, strengthening arguments against the local authority's attempts to compel accommodation contrary to his wishes.

The judgement examined the delicate balance between statutory child protection duties and individual liberty rights. The court considered whether the proposed deprivation of liberty was proportionate to the identified risks and whether less restrictive alternatives had been adequately explored.

On 2 May 2025, the court rejected Kent County Council's application, determining that the proposed order would unlawfully compel G's accommodation. The decision rested on broader interpretation of G's rights, reinforcing local authorities' obligations to respect older adolescents' autonomy. The court emphasised that G's welfare and mental health were paramount, recognising that forced accommodation could cause additional psychological harm rather than provide protection.

The ruling established important precedent regarding the limits of local authority powers when seeking to override the expressed wishes of competent adolescents. It clarified that Section 20 accommodation must remain genuinely voluntary, particularly for older children capable of understanding their circumstances.

This case contributes to evolving jurisprudence on child welfare, highlighting courts' commitment to ensuring young people's voices are heard and respected in proceedings affecting their lives. The decision reinforces that child protection measures must be proportionate and that adolescents approaching majority possess significant rights to self-determination.

The judgement's implications extend beyond G's immediate circumstances, informing future cases where local authorities seek to restrict adolescent liberty under child protection provisions. It demonstrates the courts' careful scrutiny of applications that would significantly curtail young people's autonomy, ensuring such interventions meet strict legal thresholds and genuinely serve the child's best interests rather than administrative convenience.