High Court refuses stay of costs order in Siddiqui v Financial Ombudsman Service

The High Court has refused an application to stay enforcement of a costs order made against a claimant whose judicial review challenge to the Financial Ombudsman Service was dismissed, in a ruling that scrutinised the reliability of psychiatric evidence submitted in support of the application.

In Faiz Siddiqui, R (on the application of) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2026] EWHC 1878 (Admin), Mr Justice McKendrick dealt with a series of consequential matters following his substantive judgement of 26 June 2026, which dismissed Mr Siddiqui's claim for judicial review concerning legal expenses insurance cover.

Following hand down, the claimant sought to invoke the Barrell jurisdiction, asking the court to revisit its decision, and also resisted an adverse costs order. The judge declined to reopen the judgement, finding the submissions failed to identify a proper basis for departing from established findings on the four grounds of challenge, including the application of the "calculated risk" principle derived from Dhak.

On costs, the judge ordered the claimant to pay the defendant's costs on the standard basis, with a payment on account of £25,000 within twenty-one days, reduced from the £30,916.20 sought. He rejected arguments that the case's complexity or public importance justified departing from the usual rule that costs follow the event, noting that unevidenced assertions of hardship carried little weight, citing Mahan Air & Anor v Blue Sky One Ltd & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 544 on the need for full and frank disclosure of means.

Permission to appeal on two of the original grounds was subsequently refused on 17 July 2026, after the claimant was granted two short extensions of time to file his grounds, the second of which could not be considered before the amended deadline had already been met.

The claimant then applied for a stay of execution of the costs order under CPR r 83.7(4)(a), relying on a witness statement from his solicitor and a supporting letter from a consultant psychiatrist, which asserted that enforcement action risked triggering a cardiovascular or cerebrovascular event and would stifle the claimant's ability to pursue his appeal. The application also invoked section 20 of the Equality Act 2010 and the Supreme Court's reasoning in R (on the application of UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.

Mr Justice McKendrick attached little weight to the psychiatric letter, identifying multiple deficiencies: the absence of a letter of instruction, no explanation of when or whether the claimant had been assessed, no account of the psychiatrist's competence to comment on cardiovascular risk, and no explanation for why earlier submissions on the claimant's behalf had made no reference to these health concerns. The judge also observed the apparent tension between the claimant's stated incapacity and his active pursuit of both the Barrell application and permission to appeal.

Finding an insufficient evidential basis for a stay, the judge noted it remained open to the claimant to seek a variation of the payment terms on proper evidence of means, or to renew the stay application before the Court of Appeal. Despite indicating sympathy with the defendant's submission that the application be certified as totally without merit, the judge declined to make that certification given the claimant's asserted ill health.