Harrison v Information Commissioner: University donation agreements and FOIA transparency

The First-tier Tribunal has ruled that King's College London cannot rely on commercial interests exemptions to withhold donation agreements from a prominent Hong Kong donor, in a significant judgement for transparency in higher education funding.

Anna Harrison, represented by UK-China Transparency, sought information about agreements between King's College London and Dr Lau Ming-wai, whose donations established the Lau China Institute. The college had disclosed the donor's identity and donation amounts—£6 million in 2011 and £5 million in 2020—but refused to release the underlying gift and donation agreements, citing sections 41(1) and 43(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

The Information Commissioner initially supported the college's position, concluding that disclosure would likely prejudice its commercial interests by deterring future donors. The Commissioner accepted the college's argument that releasing "granular information" about donor agreements would signal an inability to protect donor privacy, potentially discouraging philanthropic support.

The Tribunal fundamentally disagreed with this reasoning. Judge Stephen Roper found no clear link between disclosure and prejudice to commercial interests. The college had already publicly identified Dr Lau as a donor and disclosed the precise donation amounts. The Tribunal could not reconcile privacy concerns with information already in the public domain.

Critically, both agreements contained clauses permitting the college to publicise the donor's name and donation value. The Gift Agreement explicitly stated that Dr Lau agreed to allow publication of his name and gift value in various publications and press releases. The Donation Agreement's standard terms included similar provisions, with confidentiality protections limited to information "belonging to a party relating to its business, academic, scientific or other activities"—a narrower definition than the Commissioner had applied.

The Tribunal noted that standard terms and conditions had already been disclosed, meaning most "granular information" was available regardless. Moreover, the Donation Agreement explicitly acknowledged the college's obligations under FOIA, putting Dr Lau on notice of potential disclosure.

On section 41(1), the Tribunal quickly dismissed its application. This exemption requires information to have been obtained from another person. The agreements had evidently been prepared by the college itself, making the exemption inapplicable.

The Tribunal did, however, uphold section 40(2) protection for certain personal data. Whilst Dr Lau's name and donation details could be disclosed—given the lack of reasonable privacy expectation for information already public—his address, signature, and personal data of third parties mentioned in the agreements could be redacted.

The judgement corrects the Commissioner's position on procedural breaches. Whilst the college did breach sections 1(1)(b) and 10(1) through delayed disclosure, the Tribunal found the Commissioner erred in stating the college breached section 17(1) by later relying on additional exemptions. Case law establishes that late reliance on exemptions does not breach section 17(1); the actual breach was failing to issue a refusal notice within the statutory 20 working days.

The college must now disclose both the 2011 Gift Agreement and the 2020 Donation Agreement, including the appended Confirmation Paper, subject only to redactions of personal data under section 40(2). This must occur within 35 days, assuming no appeal.

This decision establishes important precedent that universities cannot rely on generic concerns about donor relations to withhold agreements where donor identity and contribution amounts are already public knowledge.