Halborg v Solicitors Regulation Authority: suspension upheld after sustained unmeritorious litigation

Scott Halborg, a partner and majority shareholder at Deals and Disputes Solicitors LLP, was suspended by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in April 2025 following a prolonged course of litigation arising from a family trust dispute. The High Court has now dismissed his appeals against both that suspension and an earlier interim condition imposed on his practising certificate.

The underlying proceedings centred on claims brought by Halborg and his company, Halborg Limited, against his parents over funds allegedly held on trust. His firm acted for him in the litigation and he was simultaneously the fee-earner, instructing client, and — in later proceedings — solicitor-advocate. A second claim targeted the legal team representing his parents.

Between February 2021 and late 2023, a succession of judges found multiple applications to be totally without merit. Two limited civil restraint orders were made by HHJ Bloom in July 2021, followed by a general civil restraint order ("GCRO") by HHJ Clark in September 2021. Mr Justice Cotter, reviewing 24 applications for permission to appeal in June 2022, observed that something had "gone very badly wrong" with the conduct of the litigation and that Halborg "has long forgotten the requirement on all parties to litigation to help the Court further the overriding objective." HHJ Walden-Smith, presiding over the eventual trial, remarked that "no part of the litigation has been conducted by [Halborg] in a matter which is appropriate for an officer of the court."

Halborg admitted the factual allegations and conceded breaches of Principles 1 and 2 of the SRA Principles 2019 and paragraphs 2.4 and 2.6 of the Code of Conduct. The sole issue before the Tribunal was whether the admitted conduct also breached Principle 5 — the duty to act with integrity. The Tribunal found that it did.

On appeal, Mrs Justice Lang applied the established test from Ali v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2021] EWHC 2709 (Admin): the court will only interfere where the Tribunal's evaluation falls outside the bounds of what it could properly and reasonably decide. The judgement reaffirms the high threshold that applies in this context.

Several grounds were dismissed in turn. The argument that the Tribunal had improperly relied on evidence beyond the agreed statement of facts failed; the Tribunal was entitled to consider all material before it, including emails sent by Halborg to the opposing solicitor exhibited within a witness statement. The contention that a 15-week delay between the oral decision and the written judgement rendered the reasons suspect was rejected as speculative and unfounded. The procedural complaint that the Tribunal gave no warning it was considering suspension — leaving counsel unable to address the point — was also dismissed, given that senior counsel was familiar with the Guidance Note on Sanction and suspension was a realistic possibility on the facts.

Of broader significance is the court's treatment of the integrity question. Lang J declined to follow Hurst v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2026] EWHC 85 (Admin), in which Collins Rice J had characterised a lack of integrity as connoting "moral turpitude" and "bad faith" requiring an elevated standard of proof. Lang J held that those observations are not supported by the authorities and that the correct approach remains that set out by Jackson LJ in Wingate v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2018] 1 WLR 3969. Integrity means adherence to the ethical standards of the profession; it does not require dishonesty or bad faith to be established.

The jurisdictional challenge — that regulation could not reach conduct undertaken as a private litigant — was swiftly disposed of. Following Beckwith v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2020] EWHC 3231 (Admin), private conduct engages professional obligations where it realistically touches on the practice or standing of the profession. Given that Halborg had signed pleadings and statements of truth as a solicitor and had acted as solicitor-advocate, the professional nexus was plainly satisfied.

The 12-month suspension and the costs order of £30,630 both stand. The interim condition appeal was dismissed on the basis that the review decision of March 2025 constituted a lawful and proportionate exercise of the SRA's discretionary judgement.