Girboiu v Vrancea Tribunal: warrant read as a whole supplies missing dishonesty for dual criminality

The Administrative Court has confirmed that the ingredients of a foreign offence set out in an arrest warrant may be read together with the conduct described in Box E when assessing dual criminality, dismissing an appeal against extradition to Romania.

In Girboiu v Vrancea Tribunal [2026] EWHC 1816 (Admin), handed down on 17 July 2026, Mr Justice Mould dismissed an appeal against the order of District Judge King and refused permission on two renewed grounds.

Gheorghe Girboiu, 62, is sought on two conviction warrants issued in May 2024 under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, carrying remaining sentences of three years and four months and four years respectively, for offences of fraud and tax evasion committed in 2007 and 2011. He left Romania in 2012 and was found to be a fugitive. An earlier request was discharged in October 2017 for want of a prison conditions assurance.

The principal argument was that neither warrant particularised dishonesty, an essential element of fraud by false representation under section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 and of cheating the public revenue at common law. Counsel invoked the inevitable inference test in Assange, as explained in Cleveland, and relied on Gruszka and Kusza, where equivocal particulars defeated the inference.

Mould J rejected the submission that the inquiry is confined to the conduct in Box E. Following FK v Germany, the warrant is read as a whole, and Box E in each warrant cross-referred to the specific code provisions, which the warrants themselves set out. Nor did this offend Norris: the House of Lords excluded mere narrative background but required account to be taken of allegations relevant to the description of the corresponding domestic offence, and allegations expressed by reference to the constituent elements of the Romanian offences qualify.

Read that way, the gap closed. The first warrant alleged the appellant misled 24 workers into performing building work in the aim of obtaining an unjust material benefit, wording the judge described as a description of dishonest intent. The second offence, cashing income while evading tax with the aim of embezzlement, likewise imported dishonesty for the purposes of cheating the public revenue. On the second warrant, bounced cheques alone would not establish dual criminality, but the incorporated article 244 description carried the inference that the appellant presented a false deed as true to obtain an unjust benefit.

Permission was refused on the section 20 ground. On the first warrant, the statement that the appellant appointed a lawyer who represented him throughout was unambiguous, and under Cretu and Merticariu the executing court does not conduct an independent investigation into such statements. On the second, Mould J gave little weight to the assertion that summonses were sent to an address the appellant had left, accepting it improbable he received notice. That did not preclude a finding of deliberate absence. Applying Bertino, the appellant had given statements at the outset of the investigation, knew of the proceedings, and was obliged to notify any change of address. In leaving without notice he put himself beyond the reach of the Romanian authorities knowingly and intelligently, and so waived his right to be present.

The article 8 ground also failed. The court accepted that the six and a half year gap after the 2017 discharge was unexplained, and that delay both diminishes the public interest and heightens the impact on private life under H(H). But fugitivity attenuates that weight, and the district judge had expressly considered both periods. Fresh evidence that the appellant's partner had been approved as foster carer reinforced rather than undermined the conclusion, indicating the child's attachment and support would continue.