Float Capital ruling: ICC judge revisits liquidator's fees after Good Box decision

The Insolvency and Companies Court has discharged an order approving increased remuneration for a joint liquidator of Float Capital Limited, after Chief ICC Judge Briggs concluded that a Court of Appeal decision handed down shortly after the original hearing undermined its jurisdictional basis.

In Re Float Capital Limited [2026] EWHC 2077 (Ch), Chief ICC Judge Briggs exercised the power under rule 12.59(1) of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016 to review orders he had made on 24 July 2026, following judgement in [2026] EWHC 1891 (Ch). Those orders fixed the remuneration of Mr Bouchier on a time-costs basis and increased and approved that of Mr Woodthorpe, his fellow joint liquidator, by reference to a fee estimate of £1,272,872.

Shortly after the judgement was handed down, the court became aware of the Court of Appeal's decision in Frost v The Good Box Co Labs Limited [2025] EWCA Civ 252, which had not been cited at the earlier hearing. Good Box preferred a narrow construction of rules 18.24 and 18.28 of the Rules, holding that the power to increase the "rate or amount" of an office-holder's remuneration corresponds directly to the three bases set out in rule 18.16. Where remuneration has been fixed on a time-cost basis, any increase beyond the original estimate must proceed through rule 18.30 rather than by a general application under rule 18.24.

Having invited submissions from the applicants, Chief ICC Judge Briggs found the circumstances exceptional enough to justify review under rule 12.59(1), applying the established test from Fitch v Official Receiver and Papanicola v Humphreys. He confirmed that the order relating to Mr Bouchier stood, as his remuneration had been fixed under rule 18.23. The order relating to Mr Woodthorpe could not survive Good Box, however, and was discharged.

The judgement then turned to the more difficult question of how Mr Woodthorpe might now seek to draw remuneration above his original estimate. Rule 18.30(2)(b) directs such applications to the body that fixed the remuneration basis, in this case the creditors. The court found that mechanism incapable of producing a determination: the majority creditor, holding roughly 98 per cent of unsecured debt, could not appropriately vote owing to a conflict of interest, while the remaining creditors had shown sustained passivity throughout the administration and liquidation. Because section 246ZF(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986 requires remuneration decisions to proceed by way of a qualifying decision procedure, deemed consent was unavailable, leaving no realistic prospect of any vote being cast.

Chief ICC Judge Briggs held that, in these narrow circumstances, section 112 of the Insolvency Act 1986 could be invoked to allow the court itself to determine the remuneration question. He was careful to frame this as operating on the rule 18.30 machinery rather than displacing it, stressing that section 112 could not be used simply because recourse to the Rules was inconvenient. It was the demonstrated incapacity of the creditor decision procedure, rather than any general dissatisfaction with the statutory route, that engaged the court's supervisory jurisdiction.

Satisfied that determining the question was just and beneficial under section 112(2), given that the underlying work had already been carried out, the judge indicated that the court would proceed to fix Mr Woodthorpe's remuneration and invited counsel to address him on the form of order.

The decision offers a rare illustration of a court reviewing and discharging its own order within days of handing it down, and highlights the practical difficulties that can arise for office-holders where creditor bodies are either conflicted or disengaged.