F v M: Family Court criticises professionals for presuming abuse before findings were made

When professionals working with a child in abuse proceedings tell a court that they "always believe the children", the warning lights should flash. In F v M, Her Honour Judge Owens found that they did not flash nearly early enough, and that the consequences for the integrity of the evidence were serious.

The case concerned a six-year-old girl, referred to as A, whose mother alleged that the father had sexually and physically abused her. The father denied the allegations and contended that the mother had, consciously or unconsciously, coached A into making them. After a five-day fact-finding hearing at Oxford Family Court, HHJ Owens found neither set of allegations fully proved, but her findings on the conduct of professionals involved in A's care are the most significant aspect of this judgement for wider practice.

The SAFE worker assigned to A told the court plainly: "I always believe the children, we must always believe the children." HHJ Owens identified this as precisely the approach that MacDonald J warned against in Re P (Sexual Abuse: Finding of Fact Hearing) [2019] EWFC 27, and which had caused such damage in the Cleveland and Orkney enquiries. As the judge observed, an organisation working with a child before any conviction, finding or admission of abuse, and operating from the starting assumption that abuse has occurred, risks undermining the very evidence it is helping to gather. It is not, as HHJ Owens noted, ultimately putting the child's interests first.

The same failure of open-mindedness pervaded the wider professional involvement. Social workers, agencies and the Local Authority disclosure were all described as "peppered" with references to A having made "disclosures", a word the social worker was unable to distinguish from "allegation" when pressed. He was also unable to acknowledge that a matter being reported to the police was not the same as a criminal conviction. HHJ Owens directed both the SAFE organisation and the social worker to review MacDonald J's guidance and to consider whether their working practices and training needed to change accordingly.

The evidential picture that emerged from this professional environment was troubling. Accounts of what A had said had been filtered through adults who had already decided what had happened. The mother had asked leading questions on video. Family members had access to a private notebook of allegations and produced witness statements using near-identical wording to its entries. Sessions with the SAFE worker, some conducted at home with the mother present, had not been approached with the neutrality required. One session produced a comment from A about hoping her father "went to jail", a remark whose sophistication HHJ Owens found unlikely to have originated with A herself.

The judgement is a careful application of the framework set out across Re P, A (No.2) (Children) (Findings of Fact) [2019] EWCA Civ 1947 and the Family Justice Council's December 2024 guidance on alienating behaviours, and it illustrates starkly what happens when that framework is ignored on the ground. Professionals are required to keep an open mind. Taking a child's account seriously is not the same as treating it as established fact, and the distinction matters enormously, both for the integrity of any proceedings that follow and for the child at the centre of them.

A's welfare proceedings will now continue. She has not seen her father for over two years. The judge found no safeguarding reason for that to continue.

The father appeared in person. Mr Kelleher appeared for the mother. Ms Patel appeared for the child through her Rule 16.4 Guardian, NYAS. Ms Belegu was appointed as Qualified Legal Representative.