European briefing | Ignorance is bliss: lawyers' advice as justification for non-compliance

Ignorance of the law is no defence, but can defendants shield behind 'legal advice which is later deemed inapplicable, asks Paul Stanley NO
'Can proceedings be brought against an undertaking for a cartel offence if that undertaking erroneously assumed that its own conduct was lawful?' That is how Advocate General Kokott summarised the issue in Case C-681/11 Schenker (Grand Chamber, 18 June 2013). English lawyers, brought up on the principle that ignorance of the law is no defence, may not be surprised to hear that the essential answer given by the ECJ was that such an assumption is not an excuse. The main interest in the case is in the difference of approach between the ECJ and the Advocate General.
Schenker was a reference from an Austrian court, which was considering whether to penalise various freight forwarding companies who had participated in a price-fixing cartel. The freight forwarders had taken advice from specialist competition lawyers in Austria who had allegedly advised that all would be well so long as the cartel was restricted to Austria where, under the then-prevailing Austrian law, it was apparently permissible because of market shares. They had also made applications in the Austrian courts which, while they were focused on domestic issues, had made orders which the freight forwarders thought implied that their price-fixing had no effect on trade between member states. They relied on these facts to show that any infringement had been neither intentional nor negligent, so that it should not attract penal sanctions.
One can start with the ECJ's decision, which appeared to be categorical: a lawyer's advice that conduct will not breach Article 101 is no defence; and a national authority's decision that it does not do so is equally no defence, since only the European Commission has power to decide that there has been no breach of EU competition law. (Under the decision in Case C-375/09 Tele2 Polska [2011] ECR I-3055, decentralised competition enforcement is a one-way street: national authorities can decide that there have been breaches, but not that there have not been.)
This seems simple enough: breach of competition law is a strict liability administrative offence. But Regulation 1/2003 expressly says that fines should be imposed only where they infringe competition law "intentionally or negligently". Does that not require fault? And does bona fide reliance on legal advice not negate that fault?
The ECJ's answer was that there was fault so long as the person concerned knew or ought to know that his conduct was anti-competitive. If I know my conduct is anti-competitive but believe that it is lawful (for instance, because I wrongly believe it has no effect on trade between member states, or I wrongly think that EU law only applies to cross-border cartels), then I have no defence.
This opens up the chink of a possible defence, if the advice of lawyers (or, presumably economists) is not merely that conduct is lawful but that conduct is not anticompetitive. But it is a very narrow chink, especially because it is clear that the standard required to show negligence is very low. It also requires one to ask a rather odd question, and not necessarily an easy one, since deciding whether conduct is anticompetitive can be notoriously hard.



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