Court of Appeal upholds foreign law finding in Kerish v Opel commercial agency dispute

The Court of Appeal has dismissed a challenge to a trial judge's assessment of Palestinian law, reaffirming the narrow scope for appellate interference with findings of foreign law and declining to delay resolution to await prospective rulings from the Palestinian courts. Lord Justice Popplewell gave the leading judgement in Kerish International Motors Agency v Opel Automobile GmbH on 7 July 2026, with Lord Justice Lewison and Sir Julian Flaux agreeing.

Kerish, a car dealer operating outside Ramallah in the West Bank, had been appointed Opel's non-exclusive distributor in the Palestinian territory under a 2012 agreement governed by English law. After Opel terminated on twelve months' notice, Kerish claimed compensation as a commercial agent under Palestinian Law No. 2 of 2000, relying on a clause entitling it to such compensation where mandated by national law. Following a five day trial, David Quest KC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, held that national law meant Palestinian law but that Kerish did not qualify as a commercial agent, having bought and resold vehicles in its own name and for its own account.

The appeal generated an unusual constitutional preliminary. When granting permission, Males LJ raised whether the "one voice" principle prevented the English courts giving effect to Palestinian law, given that the Government had not then recognised Palestine. The hearing was adjourned so that the position could be ascertained. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office confirmed there was no policy objection, and the Government subsequently recognised Palestine, removing the point. Opel's Respondent's Notice, contending that national law meant English law, fell away once the court proceeded on the assumption that Palestinian law applied.

Findings of foreign law and the limits of appeal

Popplewell LJ located the case at the far end of the spectrum described in Perry v Lopag Trust Reg, where the judge's skill in domestic law plays a minimal role. The issue turned on an Arabic statutory text whose translation was disputed, informed by Palestinian and Jordanian authorities running to hundreds of pages, and resolved by preferring the evidence of Opel's expert over that of Kerish's. Findings of that kind have a close kinship to other findings of fact, and an appellate court will be slow to intervene, mindful of Lewison LJ's metaphors of "island-hopping" and the trial as "the first and last night of the show".

Against that standard, counsel for Kerish faced what the court called a nigh impossible task. His arguments were largely his own constructions of the translated texts rather than points drawn from the expert evidence, an approach the court held impermissible following Byers v Saudi National Bank. Neither the written reports relied upon by the judge nor any transcript of the oral evidence had been placed before the Court of Appeal, leaving no basis to reassess the expert's opinion or his answers in cross-examination. Each of the six grounds, spanning the effect of ministerial registration, the treatment of commission agency in the case law, the relevance of ownership of goods, and the meaning of "profit margin", was rejected as failing to show the judge was plainly wrong.

The court also refused Kerish's late application to remit the matter to await decisions expected from the Palestinian appellate courts. Whether those rulings would emerge within a reasonable period, still less assist Kerish, was entirely speculative. Describing the invitation as "Micawberism", the court held that finality required the clock to be stopped, and the appeal was dismissed.