Court of Appeal rejects "last resort" approach to Wells sharing in Culligan v Rosemin-Culligan

Court of Appeal orders equal division of £19m Colendi shares, rejecting unequal split by first instance judge.
The Court of Appeal has overturned a High Court financial remedy order that split illiquid business assets unequally between divorcing spouses, holding that Wells sharing carries no principle confining it to a "last resort" or "minority element" of an award.
In Anthony David Culligan v Diane Liza Rosemin-Culligan [2026] EWCA Civ 948, Lord Justice Moylan, with whom Lord Justices Coulson and Arnold agreed, allowed the husband's appeal against a final financial remedy order made by Mr Justice MacDonald in September 2025. The judge below had divided the parties' capital equally by value at approximately £13.7 million each, but structured the award so that 70 per cent of the husband's share and only 30 per cent of the wife's share comprised illiquid assets, namely shares in Colendi Holdings Limited valued at £19 million gross.
The Colendi shares originated from the husband's shareholding in SETL Limited, itself built from the proceeds of an early Bitcoin investment, which was acquired by Colendi in a share swap in January 2023. The first instance judge concluded that it was fair for the husband to bear a larger share of the consequences of that transaction, finding that he had converted a substantial matrimonial asset into an illiquid minority interest without consulting the wife, and fixed the extent of Wells sharing, the practice derived from Wells v Wells [2002] EWCA Civ 476 of dividing risk-laden assets in specie, at 30 per cent.
Lord Justice Moylan held that the judge had been led into error by treating Versteegh v Versteegh [2018] EWCA Civ 1050 as establishing that Wells sharing should be a "last resort" comprising only a "minority element" of an award. That formulation, his Lordship explained, derived not from the ratio of the Court of Appeal in Versteegh but from a passage of Mostyn J quoted without endorsement by Lewison LJ. No such principle existed, nor did any countervailing principle that Wells sharing should be "standard fare". The correct approach, drawing on Martin v Martin [2018] EWCA Civ 2866, remained a broad evaluative exercise directed at achieving a fair balance of risk and illiquidity between the parties.
The judgement also found the first instance judge's substantive reasoning unsustainable. The finding that the husband had failed to consult the wife before the SETL sale was inconsistent with the judge's own earlier rejection of that same conduct allegation, and the evidence indicated the sale would have proceeded regardless, given SETL's precarious financial position absent the Colendi transaction. Nor did the evidence support treating the Colendi shares as more illiquid or more risky than the SETL shareholding they replaced; if anything, the share swap appeared to have enhanced rather than diminished the prospect of realising value.
Weighing the parties' broadly equivalent housing needs and earning capacities against the limited weight to be given to the husband's continued involvement with Colendi, given his shareholding of only 3.6 per cent, the court concluded that the Colendi shares should be shared equally. The order was varied to increase the wife's contingent entitlement from 30 to 50 per cent of the value received from the shares, with the former matrimonial home to be sold and the husband receiving 40.4 per cent of the net proceeds to balance the adjustment, that percentage to apply irrespective of the eventual sale price.












