Court of Appeal overturns foster care ruling in Re L and orders adoption placement for infant girl

The Court of Appeal has allowed a local authority's appeal against the refusal of a placement order for a 14-month-old girl, known as A, finding that the recorder's decision left the child without a workable care plan and failed to engage properly with the statutory framework governing adoption proceedings.

Handed down on 20 May 2026, the judgement in L (A Child: Placement and Contact Orders) [2026] EWCA Civ 639 was delivered by Lord Justice Peter Jackson, with Lady Justice King and Lord Justice Bean (Vice-President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division) agreeing. The appeal was brought by Gloucestershire County Council, supported by A's Children's Guardian, against a decision of Recorder Calway at the Family Court at Gloucester.

A had been in foster care since she was 11 months old. Her four brothers, aged between 7 and 13 at the time of the original hearing, were separately placed under care orders with plans for long-term fostering. No appeal was brought in respect of those children.

The recorder's approach

The recorder, having ruled out return to the parents, declined to make a placement order on the basis that A's bonds with her parents and siblings outweighed the benefits of adoption. He was, in his own words, "unable to be satisfied that her important relationships with her parents and siblings would be retained if a placement order was made." He accordingly made a care order alone.

The Court of Appeal identified five interlocking errors. First, the recorder had failed to treat A's need for permanence as a primary consideration, reducing it to a mere benefit rather than recognising it as her most pressing developmental need. Second, the prospects of long-term foster care were not adequately examined, despite uncontested evidence from the social worker and clinical psychologist that it could not provide A with the lifelong sense of belonging that adoption could.

Third, the recorder had erroneously settled on a care order under the Children Act 1989 before addressing the placement order application under the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Lord Justice Peter Jackson reaffirmed that, where a placement order application is before the court, the welfare analysis must be conducted under s.1 ACA 2002 from the outset, consistent with Re C [2013] EWCA Civ 1257 and Re B [2022] EWCA Civ 40. Fourth, no care plan existed to support the care order actually made, and the local authority was never invited to reconsider its position. Fifth, and perhaps most critically, the recorder failed to consider the court's power under s.26 ACA 2002 to make a contact order as a means of preserving A's sibling and family relationships post-placement.

A false dichotomy

The judgement identified the central flaw as a false either/or choice between family bonds and adoption. As Lord Justice Peter Jackson put it, the professionals had not advanced such a binary; their position was "both/and" whereby A would have the permanence of adoption alongside structured, ongoing contact with her birth family. The recorder, having failed to consider whether contact orders could secure those relationships, was not entitled to treat their preservation as incompatible with a placement order.

Orders substituted

Rather than remit the matter, the Court of Appeal exercised its powers under FPR 52.20 to substitute a placement order, dispensing with parental consent under s.52 ACA 2002. A contact order under s.26(2)(b) ACA 2002 was also made, requiring the local authority to facilitate face-to-face sibling contact monthly until placement, and four times yearly thereafter until adoption. No order was made in respect of parental contact, though the court approved the local authority's care plan providing for once-yearly direct contact and annual letterbox contact with both parents. The no order principle was applied to parental contact in view of the uncertainties surrounding the father's circumstances.

The judgement serves as a significant reminder of the court's duty to consider the full range of its powers before concluding that competing welfare considerations cannot be reconciled.