Companies House and the architecture of financial crime

Behind the unassuming façade of Companies House lies a systemic vulnerability: the ease with which fraudulent shell companies can be registered, operated, and dissolved, all with minimal scrutiny. For years, this loophole has enabled money laundering, tax evasion, human trafficking, and other serious organised crime to take root behind the veneer of corporate respectability.

The recent warning from the National Crime Agency concerning the use of dormant or fake entities for financial crime is neither surprising nor new. But it comes at a time when pressure is mounting for the UK’s company registration system to evolve from passive database to proactive gatekeeper.

A System Built for Access, Not Scrutiny

The scale of the issue is vast. Companies House has historically prioritised speed and accessibility over vetting. While this approach has encouraged business formation and innovation, it has also created a back door for criminal activity. Minimal identity checks, nominal oversight, and limited enforcement capability have made it one of the easiest systems in the world to abuse. Shell companies, often registered with fictitious directors, false addresses or nominee shareholders, are routinely used to layer and transfer illicit funds, not only within the UK but across borders, obscuring trails and frustrating enforcement.

This is not theoretical. It’s an operational reality in many financial crime investigations. In cases ranging from carousel VAT fraud to drug-related money laundering, UK-registered companies have been used to circulate illicit funds across corporate structures, facilitating the extraction of proceeds beyond the reach of domestic authorities. These entities often interact with legitimate businesses, creating a dangerous blurring of lines that can confuse regulators, banks, and even law enforcement. The result: criminal wealth hidden in plain sight.

New Powers, Old Problems: The Implementation Gap

Reform is finally underway. Identity verification requirements, additional transparency obligations, and new enforcement powers have been introduced as part of broader economic crime legislation. In principle, these changes are welcome. Requiring directors to verify their identities and empowering Companies House to reject and remove suspicious entities are long-overdue steps toward restoring trust.

From November 2025, under the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023, all directors and persons with significant control have to verify their identity at Companies House.  Failure to do this may result in fines, prosecution, disqualification or a note on the register. 

Companies House can now also query and reject any filings which appear suspicious or inaccurate, and they can unilaterally remove false or misleading information.  They are also now allowed to share information with other law enforcement agencies and government departments. 

These developments should help Companies House to support law enforcement in their role of investigating and preventing money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. In particular, it is hoped that it will be easier to identify individuals with multiple directorships or those using fake or stolen identities. Currently, the same directors cannot be linked because they miss out their middle name, use a different address or change their date of birth. Often, the number of companies within a criminal network can be underestimated because the individual has hidden their identity. 

Once the November 2026 deadline for all verifications has passed, anyone dealing with an English or Welsh company will be able to check whether the identity of the directors has been verified. Any professionals dealing with these companies will likely be expected to have checked the verification as part of their AML and identification procedures. If a director has not been verified, the question is then asked: why not, and is this an indication of some wrongdoing?

The government has indicated that it is looking to ‘deter, disrupt and ultimately convict criminals’; a worthy target. However, the practical implementation of these reforms raises difficult questions. Companies House is facing a volume problem. With millions of entities on its register and thousands more added each week, enforcement at scale will require not only robust systems but also a significant increase in staffing, technology, and investigative capacity. Without these, the risk is that reforms remain more symbolic than effective, a policy without meaningful impact.

There is also an enforcement paradox: compliance requires monitoring, and monitoring requires enforcement. If directors fail to verify their identities, or if beneficial owners remain obscured behind offshore structures, what happens next? Will Companies House reject applications, strike off companies, issue penalties, or refer cases for prosecution? The legislative tools are being built, but the question of operational readiness remains open.

The Corporate Veil: Concealing Organised Crime

The use of corporate vehicles in serious crime also intersects with other domains. Human trafficking cases have demonstrated how legitimate-looking companies and bank accounts — often in the names of exploited individuals — are co-opted to run illegal operations under the cover of normality. Similarly, proceeds from narcotics or counterfeit goods are frequently funnelled through layered company structures before being transferred overseas, often beyond the jurisdiction of UK law enforcement.

These patterns of abuse underscore a fundamental truth: the appearance of legitimacy is one of the most powerful tools in organised crime. The presence of a registered company, a valid bank account, or a professional address lends credibility to what may in reality be a deeply criminal enterprise. Until those appearances are subjected to meaningful scrutiny, the system will continue to be exploited.

A Coordinated Response to Corporate Abuse

Effective reform requires more than tightening company law. It demands integration across agencies: Companies House, HMRC, the NCA, banking institutions, and professional service firms. Intelligence must be shared quickly, red flags acted upon decisively, and compliance backed with credible consequences. There must also be greater visibility into patterns of abuse: recurring directors, high-volume incorporation agents, and anomalous transaction activity across linked entities.

Technology will be part of the solution, but it is not a panacea. Algorithms can help identify suspicious filings or high-risk patterns, but ultimately, human expertise is needed to interpret and investigate. Forensic accountants and financial crime investigators bring context, judgment, and the ability to link data points into actionable intelligence. They also play a crucial role in litigation support, asset tracing, and the preparation of evidential material suitable for court proceedings.

If the UK is to maintain its status as a safe and transparent place to do business, the integrity of its company registration system must be treated as a national economic priority. That means not just tightening the gate, but also monitoring the garden. Once formed, companies must be visible, trackable, and accountable, especially when their activities raise suspicion.

From Opacity to Accountability: The Road Ahead

There is a balance to strike. Ease of doing business should not come at the expense of enabling crime. But neither should anti-fraud measures be so burdensome as to stifle legitimate enterprise. The key is intelligent, proportionate enforcement that targets risk, deters abuse, and restores confidence in the system as a whole.

Shell companies, by design, offer opacity. The challenge ahead is to turn transparency from an aspiration into a standard. That will require vigilance, investment, and political will, but also a cultural shift in how the business community, regulators, and the public think about corporate responsibility. Fraud may exploit appearances, but reform must deal in reality.