Cambridge & Counties Bank v Thompson: secret commission claim cannot block return of classic cars

High Court orders return of classic cars, finding undisclosed commission unlikely to defeat lender's title.
A lender that paid undisclosed commission to a borrower's broker is entitled to the immediate return of seven classic and high-performance cars, the High Court has held. The court found no real prospect that an unfair relationship claim would lead to a remedy depriving the lender of title.
In Cambridge & Counties Bank Ltd v Thompson [2026] EWHC 2949 (BP), HHJ Paul Matthews, sitting as a High Court judge in Bristol, allowed the bank's appeal against a district judge's refusal to make a return of goods order.
The dispute arose from five hire purchase agreements entered into between 2019 and 2021, financing a total of £2,678,383. The vehicles included two 1970s Jaguar Broadspeed XJ12-C race cars, a Jaguar XJ220, an Aston Martin and a McLaren 765LT. Several of the agreements were sale and hire-back arrangements over cars the borrower already owned. The parties proceeded on the basis that the agreements were exempt under article 60H of the Regulated Activities Order, although sections 140A to 140C of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 still applied.
After arrears built up in 2025, the bank terminated the agreements, demanded about £1.97m and sought delivery up. By then, one car had already been sold. The borrower, initially acting in person, filed a lengthy defence and counterclaim challenging the bank's title on several grounds. He also alleged an unfair relationship arising from undisclosed broker commissions of at least £38,658.35.
District Judge Napier treated the bank's return of goods hearing as, in effect, a summary judgment application. He rejected the challenges to title but found a real prospect of success on the commission and unfair relationship issue. He also observed that if the broker owed the borrower a fiduciary duty and breached it, rescission might be available.
The bank appealed on two grounds. The first was that the judge had failed to ask whether the borrower had a real prospect of obtaining a remedy under section 140B that would actually interfere with the bank's title. The second was that he had relied on a fiduciary duty and rescission claim that had not been pleaded.
HHJ Matthews upheld both grounds. On the first, he accepted that section 140B confers a very wide discretion. However, applying Patel v Patel [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 864 and Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2024] AC 955, he held that any order must be proportionate to the unfairness found and must aim to remove its cause and reverse its financial consequences. Stripping the lender of title to its security over finance of more than £2.6m because of commission of about £38,000 would be disproportionate and would go well beyond that purpose. The usual remedy, as in Hopcraft v Close Brothers Ltd [2026] AC 877, would be an account of the commission, which does not affect title.
On the second ground, the counterclaim then before the district judge had alleged neither a fiduciary duty nor any act of rescission. Citing Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch), the judge said that on a summary judgment application the court may consider evidence reasonably expected at trial, but not a claim that has not yet been made.
The borrower's amended counterclaim did not change the outcome. The new plea was framed conditionally, was directed at the broker, who had not been joined as a party, and gave no particulars of the alleged unauthorised profits. It was not a proper basis for resisting summary judgment.
The court also expressed the provisional view that, because the agreements were exempt, the accelerated procedure in CPR Practice Direction 49C was not engaged by the bank's claim, although the point did not need to be decided.
The order was varied to require the immediate return of the vehicles, except the car that had been sold, with the parties invited to agree consequential terms.











