Bristol City Council v CC: capacity, deprivation of liberty and the limits of residential autonomy

In a judgement handed down on 30 April 2026, Mrs Justice Theis DBE, Vice President of the Court of Protection, made final declarations regarding the capacity of CC, a 23-year-old man with a learning disability and psychosis, in proceedings brought by Bristol City Council. The judgement — [2026] EWCOP 19 (T3) — addresses residence, care and support, contact with others, and financial affairs, whilst also determining whether CC's current living arrangements constitute a deprivation of liberty requiring court authorisation.

CC has a complex history involving gang affiliations, extensive criminal proceedings, and multiple placements including detention under the Mental Health Act 1983. Since February 2025 he has lived with his grandmother, EE, supported by a 2:1 care package for 30 hours per week on weekdays, with family providing cover at other times. The court heard that this period has brought relative stability and that CC has developed interests in fashion, cooking and music, placing high value on his independence.

The sole expert, Dr Radcliffe, assessed CC over ten hours and concluded that he lacks capacity across most of the domains under consideration. The court accepted those conclusions in relation to care and support, contact with strangers, and financial management. On care and support, whilst CC understands some concrete needs, he cannot understand or weigh the more dynamic support required to address his emotional dysregulation — particularly in the community — or appreciate the consequences of its absence.

The residence issue proved more nuanced. Theis J acknowledged the force of arguments from the Trust and ICB that capacity to make residential decisions cannot sensibly be divorced from capacity to understand care and support needs, drawing on Poole J's observations in Re CLF [2024] EWCOP 11. However, on the particular facts — where only one residential option exists — Dr Radcliffe accepted that CC can understand, use and weigh the relevant information about living with EE. The presumption of capacity was therefore not rebutted in that narrow context. The court was clear that any change in circumstances would require fresh assessment.

On contact, the court declined to follow the approach of treating the domain as binary. Accepting Dr Radcliffe's revised oral evidence, declarations were made that CC has capacity to make decisions about contact with named individuals — his grandmother, mother, sister, cousin, and known professionals in his MDT and care team — whilst lacking capacity regarding contact with anyone else.

Regarding finances, despite CC's ability to manage small sums, the evidence from his appointee that he would not meet any financial commitments if given unrestricted access to his money satisfied the court that his inability to understand and weigh consequences reflects incapacity rather than unwise decision-making.

On deprivation of liberty, Theis J held — describing the question as finely balanced — that the acid test in Cheshire West [2014] AC 896 is met. Although CC spends some weekday hours alone and is not physically restrained within the home, the care plan's requirement that he sleep at EE's address each night, combined with a police protocol to locate and return him should he access the community outside permitted parameters, means he is not free to leave in the relevant sense. Consistent with Cheshire West, the fact that CC has not attempted to leave is immaterial; it is the consequence that would follow that determines the position.

The judgement also contains detailed guidance on the proper instruction of experts in Court of Protection proceedings, cautioning against lengthy letters of instruction and setting out the core components required, following concerns about the management of Dr Radcliffe's instruction in this case.