Bouygues v Secretary of State for Education: Kaur principle extends Procurement Act time limit

High Court holds Procurement Act 30-day limitation period extends to next working day.
The Technology and Construction Court has ruled that the common law Kaur principle applies to the 30-day limitation period in section 106(2) of the Procurement Act 2023, so that a period ending on a weekend runs to the next working day, despite the 24-hour availability of electronic filing.
In Bouygues (UK) Ltd v Secretary of State for Education [2026] EWHC 2998 (TCC), Mr Justice Coppel decided three preliminary issues in a challenge to Lot 2 of Construction Framework 25, a £15.4bn schools framework.
Bouygues was told in an assessment summary issued on Friday 5 December 2025 that it had finished 11th, missing a place on the ten-member Lot 2 panel by 0.13 marks. Its claim form was submitted through CE-File on Monday 5 January 2026 and issued by the court two days later. The department argued that time had expired on Saturday 3 January.
When time started to run
Bouygues contended that time began only on 8 or 9 December, after it had consulted external advisers. The judge held that where a claim rests on the scores and reasons in an assessment summary, time will usually run from receipt. Digesting the summary or taking advice falls within the 30-day period, absent special circumstances such as an unintelligible or ambiguous summary.
Applying SITA UK Ltd v Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority, the judge found no substantive difference from the test under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. Bouygues had ample in-house expertise and had decided to challenge by the following morning. Time ran from 5 December, an approach that lets authorities predict when a procurement is safe from challenge.
The Kaur principle and CE-File
Unlike regulation 2(4) of the 2015 Regulations, the Act contains no provision extending periods that end on non-working days. The department argued that, because CE-File allows claims to be filed at any time, the principle in Pritam Kaur v S Russell & Sons Ltd [1973] QB 336 could not apply.
The judge disagreed, finding any inference from the omission speculative. Commencing proceedings requires a claim form to be issued, which under CPR 7.2 and Practice Direction 5C demands action by court staff who may reject a submission. That cannot happen while the office is closed. Mucelli v Government of Albania and R (Modaresi) v Secretary of State for Health confirmed that the facility for instantaneous electronic transmission does not displace the principle. The period therefore expired on 5 January.
An argument that proceedings began only on actual issue on 7 January also failed. Under paragraph 3.5(1) of Practice Direction 5C, the issue date is the date the fee is paid, here 5 January: a legal fiction, but consistent with the policy in Barnes v St Helens MBC that claimants should not bear the risk of court delay.
Extension and later claims
Had the claim been late, the judge would have extended time under section 106(3). Any mistake was reasonable given the novelty of the point, and the delay had no practical consequence. Following Amey Highways v West Sussex CC, refusing would be "sterile and potentially unjust". Bouygues bore some culpability for filing late on what it believed was the last day, which meant it failed to notify the department within the standstill period. No automatic suspension was triggered and the framework was concluded.
On the remaining issue, later complaints drawing on disclosed moderation records were generally further particulars of the scoring challenge. Allegations of breach of record-keeping and disclosure duties under sections 98, 12(1)(c) and 50 of the Act were distinct causes of action, with time running from the relevant disclosure.











