Badham v Jaguar Land Rover: EAT dismisses disability appeal on issue estoppel grounds

The Employment Appeal Tribunal has dismissed a former Jaguar Land Rover employee's appeal against a finding that he was not disabled under the Equality Act 2010, ruling that findings made in a separate, later tribunal decision meant the appeal had become academic before it was even heard.

The judgement, handed down by Sarah Crowther KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 29 July 2026, concerned Mr K Badham's challenge to a preliminary hearing decision of Employment Judge Hena, who had found in July 2024 that he was not disabled by reason of anxiety or depression as at 7 March 2022, the date on which Jaguar Land Rover refused to fund further cognitive behavioural therapy sessions for him. Mr Badham, who had been in dispute with his employer for several years, brought that refusal as the sole act of discrimination in a claim originally advanced on the basis of two possible qualifying disabilities: irritable bowel syndrome and a mental health impairment. The IBS-based claim proceeded separately to a full hearing before a different tribunal, chaired by Employment Judge Platt, which dismissed it in March 2025 on the basis that the refusal to fund further therapy had nothing to do with any disability at all, but instead reflected occupational health advice that the real barrier to Mr Badham's return to work was his unresolved dispute with the company rather than his health.

Before turning to the substance of the disability question, the deputy judge addressed an unusual procedural history in which the grounds ultimately argued at the appeal hearing had never been formally pleaded, having originated instead from observations made by another judge when permitting the case to proceed to a full hearing. Applying the principles in Khuddados v Leggate, she allowed a late amendment to the grounds of appeal, finding that the claimant, who had represented himself for most of the litigation, was not at fault for the irregular process and that the respondent had suffered no real prejudice in responding to the case actually argued.

On the central issue, the tribunal accepted the respondent's submission that the Platt tribunal's findings gave rise to an issue estoppel. Because that tribunal had found, as a necessary part of dismissing the IBS claim, that the refusal to fund further therapy was driven entirely by the employment dispute rather than any health condition, that finding applied equally regardless of which underlying impairment the claimant relied upon. It followed that Mr Badham could not now argue that the same decision had in fact been influenced by a mental health impairment. The deputy judge's analysis drew on the Court of Appeal's decision in Skatteforvaltningen v MCML, though she noted that the Supreme Court had overturned that decision the day before hand-down was due, adopting a narrower formulation confining issue estoppel to facts both necessary and fundamental to the earlier cause of action. Having sought further submissions in light of that development, she concluded the outcome remained the same on the facts of this case.

Had the appeal not been academic, the deputy judge indicated she would have dismissed it on its merits in any event, finding that Judge Hena's written reasons, while brief in places, sufficiently demonstrated a correct application of the statutory test for disability under section 6 of the Equality Act, including her conclusion that medical evidence supported a finding that Mr Badham's ability to return to work was not, at the material time, substantially affected by any mental health impairment.